BLADES AMIDST THE VELVET?
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
DURING THE EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

Merje Kuus, Assistant Professor
Department of Geography
The University of British Columbia
1984 West Mall, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z2
Canada
Tel. 604 822 3443
Fax 604 822 6150
E-mail: kuus@geog.ubc.ca

Katalin Fábián, Assistant Professor
Department of Government and Law
103 Kirby Hall
Lafayette College
Easton, PA 18042 USA
Tel. 610 330 5392
Fax 610 330 5397
E-mail: fabiank@lafayette.edu

Published in Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 39 (4): 375-396.
ABSTRACT

This paper proposes an inquiry into the strength and lengths of links among security, development, and Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the European Union (EU) enlargement. We argue that the enlargement discourse is premised on the notion of an insecure and undeveloped Central and Eastern Europe. Political developments in post-communist Europe are thereby conceived in terms uncertainty about the proximity to, or distance from, an idealized Europe or Europeanness. In order to understand how any of these categories -- security, development, and Central and Eastern Europe -- function in the enlargement discourse, we consider how post-communist Europe is framed as not yet developed, not yet fully European, and hence a potential source of insecurity to Europe.

The first part of the paper highlights how the notion of an insecure and unstable Central and Eastern Europe permeates accounts of EU enlargement, and then proceeds to outline how this notion has been reconfigured in the past decade. In particular, the paper demonstrates how Central and Eastern Europe has been layered into multiple Europes, and how security has likewise been re-framed from a military matter to a more diffuse issue of European values. This reconfiguration has made the nexus of security, development, and Central and Eastern Europe more flexible, while further reifying the binary framework of Europe.

Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, EU enlargement, security, political development, globalization

INTRODUCTION

The subject matter of this inquiry: Central and Eastern Europe has been notoriously hard to define. This is a frontier region, part of Europe, but on the edge of it and not fully integrated with it. The region’s name, what and whom it encompasses, its physical and social geography have all been fundamentally influenced by global politics. In this paper, the terms ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ and ‘accession countries’ are used synonymously to refer to the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in May 2004: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. We use these terms not to imply essential sameness among either the eight new EU members or all post-communist European countries, but to recognize these countries' similar position in the mainstream western discourses\(^1\) of development

\(^1\) Discourse is understood as a set of assumptions, claims, and modes of analysis that enable and constrain speech and practice. EU enlargement discourse hence
and underdevelopment, security and threat, and Europe vis-à-vis Eastern Europe.

While a great variety of peoples have come to settle in the Central and Eastern European region, they rarely live in consolidated and clearly defined territories. The establishment of various ancient and modern empires only further promulgated the migration and mixing of people. To control and to protect their populations, states put up both hard and soft (i.e., permeable) borders. Outstanding among these borders for its longevity (and ferociousness) was the barbed wire fence of the Cold War, demarcating a clear dividing line between East and West Europe. A generation grew up with this separation deeply engraved in mind (and body) that extended well beyond Europe to international scope. Today, this division, along with its attendant connotations of security, development and identity, are reframed in a process of European integration. The division of East and West is also re-conceptualized in a global arena of supranational spaces.\(^2\) The resulting narratives in and of accession countries are mutually constituted as they integrate (various degrees of) domestic, regional, international and global considerations. The indeterminate — or: changing determination of the — Central and Eastern European location has had a fundamental impact on the shaping of political identities in the region.

This paper investigates the ways in which the European Union (EU) enlargement discourse is framed by the construction of a stable secure Europe and an unstable, insecure Eastern Europe. The concept of security acts as a keyword in this discourse. We understand security in a broad sense; including both the military aspect of negative peace (i.e., lack of war) and the social-ecological-psychological aspects of positive peace (i.e., void of structural violence).\(^3\) Examining how security is framed between Central and Eastern

---


3 Johan Galtung originally framed the term structural violence to refer to any constraint on human potential due to economic and political structures ("Violence, Peace and Peace Research" 1969). Structural violence is pervasive and has a powerful negative impact. It encompasses poverty, unemployment, various sorts of arbitrary discrimination, such as racial, ethnic, religious, class, and sexual discrimination in political and social life. Structural violence differs from the other types of violence in that power relations within structural violence are less visible and exist in various forms infused in the existing social hierarchies. Urie Bronfenbrenner suggests that structural violence is nested within three systems,
Europe and the EU reveals a rather predictable hierarchy among participants and shows security as a particular kind of problem necessitating policy responses in the context of EU enlargement. We contend that the predictably polarized hierarchy in multiple framings of security is underpinned by a developmentalist narrative which the accession countries and EU institutions have recreated. Thus, we see discourses of security as closely bound up with those of development and Europe, all in a globally interconnected environment. In order to grasp the functioning of either security or development within the EU enlargement discourse, we must examine how these two concepts are framed by the dichotomy of Europe vs. Eastern Europe.

This essay intends to contribute to our understanding of EU enlargement by elucidating some of the key geopolitical assumptions that inform the European integration discourse. The evolutionary model of progress that underpins accounts of security and development in Central and Eastern Europe is made possible by the binary of Europe vs. Eastern Europe. We do not explicitly address the economic trajectory of development in Central and Eastern Europe because this has been done by others. Rather, we expose and examine the mutual constitution of 'security', 'development', and 'Central and Eastern Europe' within the EU enlargement discourse. The contribution to the economic and political development literature lies in picking apart the geopolitical imaginaries that re-enable development discourses in Europe. In particular, we elucidate how this nexus of security, development, and Europe is reproduced in the accession countries with cooperation by the EU agencies; that is, how these countries seek to shift themselves into Europe by projecting insecurity and underdevelopment further east. Such an exposé clarifies why evolutionary narratives of development and transition are still prevalent despite being implicated in countless dismal policy failures.

ALONGSIDE, BUT NOT TOGETHER: THE QUESTIONS OF LOCATION

Central and Eastern Europe is a significant example for demonstrating the changing process in the meaning of security and development because these two concepts are simultaneously obscure and prominent in the region. Central and Eastern Europe is infrequently considered as a site of insecurity or underdevelopment, which are generally associated with the 'Third World.' Only Marxist scholarship was irreverent enough to trace the beginnings of the ‘Third World’ to Eastern Europe. According to this stand of analysis, Eastern Europe became the West’s first colony due to the Price Revolution in the mid-sixteenth century that generated the steepest prices in agricultural production. However, the argument of Eastern Europe as a colony of the West was not too palatable and was doubly rejected. According to unspoken conventions, it became rather unusual to equate Eastern Europe with the Third World. First, mainstream Western scholarship and print media successfully marginalized the analysis of (Western) Marxists in this regard. Second, in addition to successfully minimizing the effect of Marxist criticism about colonizing Eastern Europe, the racist attitude toward the East remained latent in this discourse. To dislodge arguments which

5 The land-owning aristocracy in the East responded to these newly favorable terms of trade with the return to the earlier feudal mode of production and established the so-called “second serfdom” instead of following the emerging capitalist model. This caused the economic and political system to remain feudal long after the terms of trade shifted much in favor of industrial products. See Leften S. Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age (New York, NY: Morrow, 1981)

6 One notable review that exempted itself from these conventions and painted Central and Eastern Europe in rather monochrome tones vis-à-vis Europe was: Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1996)

7 It is important to note that Marxist activism/scholarship inside and outside of Eastern Europe enjoyed a very complicated relationship wavering between total defiance, infighting and nearly complete subjugation. While Communist parties in Western Europe have often accepted the tutelage of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, some periods and particular ideological strands have created defiant alternative positions. The topic has a very rich literature. For prominent examples, see Ernest Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism: The Bitter Fruits of "Socialism in One Country" translated by Jon Rothschild (London: NLB, 1978); Olga A. Narkiewicz, The End of the Bolshevik Dream: Western European Communist Parties in Late Twentieth Century (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990); David Childs, ed., The Changing Face of Western Communism (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press,
would have unveiled the persistently inscribed hierarchy between Eastern and Western Europe, the analytical separation of three worlds emerged that conveniently placed the communist system in the middle between the ‘First’ and the ‘Third’ worlds. Few of us can separate from this clearly hierarchical, deeply entrenched and demonic system of segregation, even now when with the disappearance of the communist political system from Europe, the ‘Second world’ lost all its possible analytical value.

In spite of the analytical ambiguities of the desired development model, or possibly, exactly because of them, the Central and Eastern European region has been the stage of a highly concerted development effort for more than a decade. Western countries and financial institutions have been coaching Eastern Europe in the ‘transition to the West.’ Said notes that western development policies have been especially missionary toward Eastern Europe (emphasis added). Security studies display a similar double framing. Central Europe is no longer explicitly described as insecure, yet the region is being rapidly incorporated into NATO, the world's most powerful military alliance in the name of securing and stabilizing it. Thus, Central Europe is constituted as both developed and developing, secure and still being secured, and, last but not least, in Europe and still not fully European. It is precisely due to such ambiguous double framing that Central Europe offers telling examples of how binary conceptions (and their corresponding hierarchies) of security and development are inscribed onto complex social realities, and how these conceptions function in the EU enlargement discourse. The binaries tackled here are not rigid; rather, they operate as latent and banal assumptions that are activated and operationalized in particular circumstances for particular goals. The task is thus to elucidate the specific ways in which they are used in daily political practice.

By examining the framing of first Eastern Europe and then security in the EU enlargement discourse, we argue here that both categories have become more flexible whilst retaining the overarching developmentalist framework of transition to Europe. With respect to Eastern Europe, we are witnessing neither a simple dissolution nor a simple continuation of the Cold War era narratives of East vs. West. Rather, the two-fold division of Europe has been replaced with a three-fold one of Europe, Central Europe and Eastern Europe. Often times the division is four-fold: Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia. The Southern part of Europe, especially the Balkans (including the Yugoslav successor states, and Romania, Bulgaria, Albania) are often also projected as yet another (fifth?) segment of Europe. However, in this developmentalist context, Spain, Portugal, and Greece are hardly any more inscribed as the Southern part

---


of Europe, but the Balkans are. In this narrative of divisions about security and development, the past communist context features dominantly as the category of division. While the regional segregation and separation appears to go on in perpetuity (for instance, including as a separate, but increasingly integrated ally for instance the Baltics, and several newly ‘discovered’ subregions, such as the Karpatho-Rusin territory/identity). The issue here lies not in the differences among various parts of Europe, but in the framing of these differences in terms of Europeanness.9 Security has been likewise reframed from a military issue (i.e., negative peace) to one of societal stability (i.e., positive peace) and European values. Insecurity is no longer a matter of direct military threat, but one of identity and moral values. Insecurities and Eastern Europes have in a way multiplied: a single insecure Eastern Europe has been layered into many and security has diffused from military defense to multiple spheres of social life. We need to take the changing security rhetoric seriously as a constituting element on discourses of development and EU enlargement. Second, the theoretical implications of these changes in the security and development environment highlight the need to situate EU enlargement in postcolonial theory.

However, the application of colonial, and therefore post-colonial theories is quite problematic in the context of Eastern Europe. Central and Eastern Europe has been an object of colonial attitudes not only from the West but also from the Russian and Ottoman empires. Many now view the Soviet Union as an empire and conceptualize the post-1989 transformations in Eastern Europe in terms of postcolonialism.10 Because today the power to constitute Central and Eastern Europe as a particular kind of place lies not with Russia but with the West, this essay focuses on the othering of Central Europe from the West. It is important to note that the emerging anti-EU discourse has started to view the EU as yet another empire, ready to take over the Central and Eastern European landscape.

With the complication of various types of colonialization in mind, it is essential to contextualize the narratives of security and development in the framework of Self and Other, and enable us to better link research on EU enlargement to the broader critique of western-led development efforts around the world.

FROM EASTERN TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE EAST IN THE EU ENLARGEMENT DISCOURSE

---

9 See various editions of Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis (Eds.), *Developments in Central and East Europe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press) as a particularly demonstrative example for the changing regional segregation.

The assumption that Eastern Europe needs to be taught European norms and should learn the ‘appropriate’ (i.e., Western European) type of capitalist development significantly pre-dates the current round of EU enlargement. The economic roots of divergence in development go back to the discovery of the Americas that divided the European continent to the Atlantic-oriented and rapidly colonizing Western part and the Eastern part that supplied the first colonization waves with grain and timber. The idea of catch-up development and re-infiltration of (Western) European values were invented in the 18th century, when Eastern Europe was demarcated as of Europe by geography, but still in the process of becoming European. Eastern Europe was conceived not as irredeemably alien, but as a half-way house between Europe and Asia: not simply backward, but like a distant and poor relative, who should learn, who can be used as an experiment and a testing ground, a.k.a. “a gigantic specimen to which the most advanced legal and administrative ideas could be applied with a completeness impossible in western Europe.”

The cliché of East European backwardness has undergone numerous permutations and transformations since its conception, but it has not dissolved. For example, the Cold War geopolitical discourse framed the Soviet Union not simply as antagonistic or backward, but also as partly Asiatic: consider, for example, Kennan's references to “the Russian or oriental mind.” Various periods of ‘high communism’ in Central and Eastern Europe (such as Ceausescu’s dictatorship in Romania, Rákosi’s immensely oppressive regime in Hungary) with their extremely broad, centralized, and brutal control further entrenched the image of this region’s ‘otherness.’ The totalitarianism of the Soviet rule was conceived as a combination of traditional Oriental despotism (as an essential attribute of Russian mentality) plus modern police technology. East European studies frequently exoticized Eastern Europe quite similarly to other

13 Iver B. Neumann, The Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) p. 78
non-western regions.\textsuperscript{16} A considerable share of the voluminous Cold War era writing on Eastern Europe thus represents not an engagement with but a disengagement from the complexities in favor of simple binaries of West vs. East, Europe vs. Eastern Europe, free vs. unfree, security vs. threat.\textsuperscript{17}

In the post-Cold War era, this disengagement from the complexities of Central and Eastern Europe has persisted, not simply as a waning legacy of Sovietology, but as an insidious premise of the EU enlargement discourse. Central and Eastern Europe is once again viewed as a gigantic testing ground. Wedel observes that Central and Eastern Europe of the early 1990s had a kind of frontier ambiance, as western consultants -- dubbed as 'The Marriott Brigade' in Poland after their favorite hotel -- flew in to give crash courses in economy and politics.\textsuperscript{18} It was Central and Eastern Europe where ‘the action’ was taking place, and aid agencies routinely diverted personnel from the 'Third World' to the 'Second World.'\textsuperscript{19} Transitology approached Eastern Europe with the same assumptions development experts had used in the 'Third World.'\textsuperscript{20}

In theory, the Western experts recognized the distinctiveness of Central and Eastern Europe, but the policy model they relied on was the one transplanted from the 'Third World': fundamentally influenced by the reigning neo-liberal ideology. The post-Cold war renaissance of modernization theory was thus logical within the global context where the collapse of communism was

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{17} Historical development on the discourse of Eastern Europe is beyond the scope of this paper. The region’s long and dense history is crucial here only to link the current productions of Eastern Europe to older constructions of the Other and to show that despite evocations of a “New Europe,” problematizations of Eastern Europe hark back to the older binary of Europe vs. the East. For historical analyses, including accounts of the Cold War era, see Simon Dalby, \textit{Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics} (New York, NY: Guilford Publications, 1990); Joanne P. Sharp, \textit{Condensing the Cold War: Reader's Digest and American Identity} (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000)
\textsuperscript{18} Janine R. Wedel. \textit{Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe} (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2001) p. 6
\textsuperscript{19} ibid., p. 18. Katherine Verdery also points to the considerable flow of professionals from British and French colonial administration to the conduct of the Cold War in the decades following WWII. “Whither Postsocialism” In \textit{Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia}, C. M. Hann (Ed.), pp. 15-22 (London: Routledge, 2002)
\textsuperscript{20} The term “transitology” denotes the strand of social science that became concerned with democratic transitions.
\end{quote}
depicted as the victory of liberalism, a.k.a. “the end of history.” Burawoy notes that modernization theory “always lurked not far below the surface of Sovietology as a repressed wish fulfillment.”

In the years since the end of the Cold War, the influence of aid agencies, IMF, and the World Bank has waned but the EU is promoting a similar neoliberal concept of transition. While acknowledging the many similarities between the powerful Western-led international aid agencies, it is important to note that the EU differs at least in a few important aspects from the other influential Western-led international institutions. First of all, beside its economic mandate, the EU is explicitly a political institution. Consequently, it does not have to camouflage its political agenda and hide the connections between its economic and political prerogatives. Second, the social-democratic traditions of the European continent and the EU’s increasingly evident competition with the USA have tempered the application of purely neoliberal policies in the East European political and (to a more limited extent) in the economic transition.

The Western assumption of Central and Eastern Europe as not yet fully European have not ceased to exist. Casual references to the inability of the natives to pull themselves to the European levels, lest the West coach them, abound in journalistic and academic writings. EU enlargement is described as a process of socializing the Central European countries into the international community. Within this process, accession countries “are taught the community values and norms and must prove their willingness and ability to internalize them.” This testified to the enduring assumption of essential difference between ‘Europe’ and Eastern Europe.

22 Modernization theory was in constant ideological competition with dependency theory, a Marxist-influenced development theory which was particularly influential in South America. Waxing and waning in influence since the 1950s, these two schools of development theories also became affiliated with monetary policies: modernization theory connected to Milton Friedman’s Chicago school, and dependency theory, although much less tightly associated, with Keynesianism. See also Michael Burawoy, “The End of Sovietology and the Renaissance of Modernization Theory” *Contemporary Sociology* 21 (6), pp. 774-785 1992, p. 774
24 For an exposé of such tropes, see Stephen F. Cohen, *Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia* (New York, NY: Norton, 2001)
Much of the research on Central and Eastern Europe is still built on oppositions such as reason and passion, modern tolerance and ancient hatreds, civic nationhood and ethnic nationalism. In numerous subtle ways, studies of privatization, marketization, and democratization plot post-socialism on the scale of (traditional and irrational) Eastern Europe to (modern and rational) Europe/West. Verdery likewise emphasizes persistent Cold War era attitudes:

The Cold War is not over; its influence is felt even now. How else to understand the importance accorded by both scholars and policy-makers alike to 'privatization', 'marketization', and 'democratization' -- that troika of western self-identity so insistently being imposed on the ex-socialist 'other' as a sign that the Cold War is over? Is the emphasis on these features driven by the ideological goal of compelling 'them' to be like our outdated image of 'us'? 

The comparison between Eastern Europe and the West still tends to turn into a comparison of the former with the latter, clearly ascribing 'normality' to one side, against which the 'other' has to measure itself. References to 'silent disciplining' of Eastern Europe by Western Europe are commonplace.

References:

30 O. Waever “The EU as Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders” In International Relations
From Threat to Insecurity: The Creation of Insecurity in Europe's Eastern Enlargement

The binaries of rational/emotional, modern/traditional, secure/insecure, and developed/developing are especially prevalent in security studies. Given security studies' particularly close ties to the military-industrial-government complex, the hold of transitology has persisted more than in other social science subfields.31 Curiously, amidst the myriad of studies on whether Central Europe is secure or how to secure it, scant attention is paid to how Central Europe has been created as a particular kind of place in the discourses of European security.

The security discourse and agenda have significantly altered and broadened with the end of the Cold War. The traditional discourse dominated by the traditional state-centric paradigm (which privileges the territorial defense of country against armed attack from foreign countries) have been forced to incorporate more diffuse and hard to name threats, such as migration, smuggling, arms proliferation, diseases, terrorism, environmental contamination. Grabbe notes that "unlike the 'macro-security' concerns of the Cold War -- which primarily involved state-controlled and politically driven threats from national militaries -- the new micro-level risks are from private individuals."32 While these threats do not appear new (their delivery techniques may be), the fact that they are increasingly integrated in the security agenda is novel. As a sign of struggle to deal with (what is perceived as) a whole new plethora of threats in the international plane, the self-perception of Western societies has started to reflect a sense of heightened insecurity. Ulrich Beck’s treatise, Risikogesellschaft (Risk Society) is emblematic of this emerging ‘Angst’ (existential fear) in Western Europe.33 The integration of the previous major threat: Eastern Europe, into the

---

33 Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne (Risk Society) (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993) How ironic it is that people in relative security have a much higher sense of vulnerability compared to those who possess very little. Contrast for instance who is more likely to take out travel insurance: the Afghan/Sudanese/Chinese immigrant smuggled in treacherous circumstances or the Western tourist? The likelihood of insurance seems to be in inverse relation with the likelihood of danger/threat on the way.
Western political and military alliances are intended to decrease the sense of insecurity and threat.

The need to stabilize Eastern Europe -- and to thereby secure Europe -- is arguably a key impetus behind EU enlargement. EU and NATO enlargements are frequently conceived as the expansion of the ‘zone of peace’ in the West into the ‘zone of turmoil’ in the East. Sher notes that not a single high-ranking EU politician has failed to underscore that the prospect of joining the EU has been decisive in propelling the accession states to implement democratic reforms. For example, Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister of Germany, claimed in a widely cited speech in 1999, that without the EU, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would pursue the “old system of balance of power with its continued national orientation, constraints of coalition, traditional interest-led politics and the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations.” This could pose insecurity to the EU, Fischer continued, because these ideologies could spread from Eastern Europe to Europe. Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, likewise proclaimed in 1999 that “Enlargement is essential if we are to spread peace, stability and shared values throughout the continent.” In another programmatic speech, Prodi said: “It is not imperialism, to want to spread these principles [of democracy, freedom, and solidarity] and to share our model of society with the peoples of Southern and Eastern Europe who aspire to peace, justice and freedom.”

The above quotes indicate that the security in the EU enlargement discourse has stretched beyond a traditional military one. Rather, security is conceived in terms of strengthening European values across Europe, and in terms of social issues such as migration and transborder crime. Critics of the extended notion of security charge that the broadening of the security agenda extends the life and (resource) reach of the military-industrial complex. The post-Cold War reframing of security refuses to consider this conspiratorial logic as the reason behind integrating a broader conception of the security agenda to encompass societal stability and quality-of-life issues. In addition, the substantial literature and debate on the expanding security agenda commonly neglects why

35 Schimmelfenning, 2000, p. 124
37 Quoted in Sher, 2001, p. 255
38 ibid., p. 263
39 ibid., p. 236
and how Central and Eastern Europe shifted from a ominous direct (military) threat to an insecure place.\textsuperscript{40} Studies of European security often evoke the potential for insecurity and instability in Eastern Europe, yet rarely examine how this notion is produced and how it functions in the EU enlargement discourse.\textsuperscript{41}

The current reframing of security thus raises questions about the extent to which it will alter the discourse of Europe. On the one hand, one could argue that the shift to societal security (i.e., positive peace) can lead to a far-reaching re-imagining of territoriality in Europe. It could also emphasize a different set of priorities in the hierarchy of values that the European Union declares as its own, shifting the liberal (social-democratic) values further up front and beyond the realist (conventional security) concerns. It replaces the traditional power-balance state-based conception of security with a less territorial conception that blurs the lines of the threatened ‘us’ and the threatening ‘them.’ This shift would be very much in harmony with the notion of globalization of “supraterritorialization.”\textsuperscript{42}

Soft security\textsuperscript{43} also erodes the monopoly of the state over the sphere of security, and allows openings for the local government and civil society. While societal security may not, and perhaps cannot, entirely eliminate boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, it cross-cuts and blurs these boundaries, and transforms the norms about how ‘we’ should deal with ‘them’. Within the discourse of EU enlargement, then, cross-border security cooperation may erode the binary of Europe and Eastern Europe. The discourse of Eastern Europe could be dismantled precisely through the same category -- security -- in which name it was reified during the Cold War.

There is substantial empirical evidence to support this optimistic line of interpretation and forecasting. Across Central and Eastern Europe, governmental

\begin{itemize}
\item for exceptions, see C. S. Browning, “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in the European North” \textit{Geopolitics} 2003, 8(1), 45-56; Iver B. Neumann, \textit{The Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation} (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)
\item ‘Soft’ security parallels Joseph Nye’s well-regarded concept of “soft power” \textit{(The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002). Feminist critics may rightfully object to re-creating a hierarchy between a holistic and diffuse concept of softness vis-à-vis the hard, military, ‘male’ power and security.
\end{itemize}
policy programs as well as public debates conceive security not in terms of military defense, but in terms of societal stability and individual quality-of-life. In the Baltic states, for example, the national security concepts, adopted by all three states in recent years, explicitly proclaim that these countries see no military threat to themselves from any state.44 In all three states, official governmental rhetoric frames EU and NATO accession not as an escape from direct attack, but as an expression of the Baltic states' European values. The EU as well as individual states emphasize cross-border cooperation, including cooperation with states that will not become EU members in the foreseeable future. Poland has proposed the EU's Eastern Dimension Initiative, which aims at improving cooperation with Ukraine and Belarus. The Baltic states are involved in the EU's Northern Dimension, which seeks to intensify regional cooperation with Russia. The Northern Dimension presents a particularly interesting vision of Europe, because it explicitly bypasses the East-West dichotomy in favor of an imagery of northerness. The dominant metaphors of the Northern Dimension are not borders and states, but region-building and flows: Hansa, Vikings, and the Baltic Sea.45 Northern Dimension and other such cross-border initiatives can be seen as signs of, and vehicles for, the increasing reconceptualization of security and identity boundaries in Europe. Such local-level transformation of security through transborder cooperation could be eroding the division of Europe vs. Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, once we examine the political effects of framing social issues in terms of security, societal security appears unsettlingly close to traditional approaches. For one, it may not undermine the boundaries of us/them but make them fuzzier. If we approach insecurity not as external to the object to which it presents a threat, but as an effect of the very process of establishing and maintaining the object's identity, security threats from the 'outside' are necessary for the consolidation of the identity 'inside'.46 The concept of security may necessarily imply the binary oppositions of friend/enemy,


us/them, centre/margin. One could therefore argue that framing social issues such as development or identity in terms of security, however ‘soft’, frames these issues in terms of oppositions. In cross-border cooperation, framing border areas as alternative/new sources of security may in fact marginalize these areas. Applying these arguments to EU enlargement, one could argue that framing enlargement as a security matter further bolsters the notion that Eastern Europe is insecure.

These problems are clearly borne out in Central Europe. Foreign policy discourses in Central Europe still emphasize the region’s in-between location between East and West so as to stress the urgency of EU and NATO full membership. The road to full-fledged EU membership seems to be particularly long for the eight post-communist countries that joined in 2004. The seven-year transition period to phase in full freedom of labor mobility has become one of the major sore points of contention between old and new EU members.

Regional security cooperation has not shed the notion of an insecure Eastern Europe because that notion is still needed for the production of the secure Europe. With respect to cross-border cooperation, Bialasiewicz and O’Loughlin show that Polish cooperation with the Galician regions of Ukraine does not break with the notion of insecure East but instead seeks to demarcate the Polish part of Galicia on the 'right' side of the East/West divide. Virkkunen’s analysis of cross-border cooperation in northeastern Estonia shows a similar re-inscription of the insecure Eastern Europe onto the eastern side of the Estonian-Russian border. With respect to the Northern Dimension, Moisio notes that despite the initial Finnish avoidance of the East-West dimension, the Northern Dimension acquired a clear division of East vs. West after it became a

part of EU’s eastern policies. By institutionalising transborder cooperation within the framework of EU’s Eastern policies, the Northern Dimension can be seen as a disciplinary move, one aiming at rolling back the fuzziness of borders rather than contributing to it. By operating with the conventional assumption of the backward East, these transborder cooperation initiatives have not opened new spaces for cooperation, but instead served “to re-inscribe the very world they have sought to transform.” These examples illustrate that (European) security is in many ways still defined against the supposedly less secure, stable, and ‘Western’ Eastern Europe. This definition is reproduced not only in western representations of Central and Eastern Europe, but also in Central and Eastern European representations of countries further east. The more Europe is eulogized as a site of values, the more Eastern Europe is cast as lacking these values, as a site of an ever more opaque but pervasive insecurity to Europe. The effect of such diffusion and layering of insecurity is that security is becoming ever less tangible whilst retaining its mobilizing capacity.

THE LAYERING OF EASTERN EUROPE

While East European studies are not monolithically blind to their history of othering, the process of naming and the changing meaning of Central and Eastern Europe have both remained relatively unexamined within that field. While there are recent trenchant critiques of the transition narrative, even this scholarship generally does not theorize this assumption as a necessary part of that narrative. Bunzl notes that very few social scientists have endeavored to trace

51 P. Joenniemi, “Can Europe Be Told from the North: Tapping into the EU's Northern Dimension” In Encountering the North: Cultural Geography, International Relations and Northern Landscapes (Eds.) F. Moller & S. Pehkonen, pp. 221-61. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Aldershot, 2003)
52 Browning, 2003, p. 48; see also Bialasiewicz & O'Loughlin, 2002
western (re)invention of Eastern Europe engendered by post-socialist transformations and EU enlargement. One of the few notable exceptions is the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, who pointed out that

(...) in Eastern Europe the West seeks for its lost origins, its own lost original experience of `democratic invention`. In other words, Eastern Europe functions for the West as its Ego-Ideal (Ich-Ideal): the point from which the West sees itself in a likeable, idealized form, as worthy of love. The real object of fascination for the West is thus the gaze, namely the supposedly naive gaze by means of which Eastern Europe stares back at the West (...)

Even after the many times debatable results of western economic aid campaigns to Central and Eastern Europe, transitology has displayed a ‘spectacular unwillingness’ to use the criticism of the transformations in the region to examine the familiar categories of Europe: market, democracy, security and development.

Scholars have conceptualized the othering of Central and Eastern Europe as a kind of orientalism by virtue of its binary premise of Europe and the East. Others argue that the discourse of Eastern Europe is distinct from orientalism. Eastern Europe is not the Middle East and not outside of Europe; it is viewed rather between West and East, on the margin of Europe. It is constructed as the East within Europe, the repository of negative connotations whilst also being a

---


part of Europe. While the Orient is a discourse of imputed opposition, Eastern Europe is a discourse of imputed ambiguity. This ambiguity makes the discourse of Eastern Europe supremely flexible: any place in Central and Eastern Europe can be constructed as European, East European, or both. Yet the persistent link to the East that is inherent in the concept of Eastern Europe, still insidiously frames Central and Eastern Europe as not fully European and hence inferior to Europe.

The coupling of otherness with unexamined problems of the development/transition process resembles development discourses elsewhere; for example, the mutual constitution of 'development' and 'Third World.' In the European context, then, the framework of the passive East, in which East Europeans learn European norms from their western benefactors, must be in place for development discourses of the World Bank, the IMF and the EU to be legible and legitimate. The relatively underdeveloped Eastern Europe is therefore not a problem but a precondition for the enlargement discourse. Only if Central and Eastern Europeans are assumed to be incapable of adequately addressing their problems is there a need for the 'brigades' of western development experts to shuttle in and impose 1980s western models on post-communist Europe. This is not to deny the value of western advice, but to argue that the particular mode in which the western aid machine has been operating is dependent on the notion of an undeveloped Eastern Europe still on the way to Europe. We therefore cannot pick apart the framework of transition unless we expose its premise of Eastern and Western Europe as ontologically different entities.

Eastern Europe functions in the EU enlargement discourse not as a fixed location but as a floating signifier, evoked and demarcated flexibly in different circumstances. Even though EU and NATO enlargement processes have changed the Cold War era division of Europe, they have simultaneously re-established a three-fold division of the (imagined entity of the) continent into the European core, the Central European new EU member countries not yet fully European but in tune with European project, and an eastern periphery effectively excluded.


from membership.\textsuperscript{60} The borders of Europe have changed, but the vacuous yet omnipresent East is still the defining feature of European identity construction.\textsuperscript{61} This layering of otherness fits snugly into the neoliberal transitologist narrative of a more integrated core and a series of less integrated peripheries. It is a precondition for that narrative.

The discourse of Eastern Europe functions not as a clear dichotomy, but as a gradation between the abstract idealized poles of Europe and Eastern Europe. Places, institutions, and individuals are not necessarily placed into one category or another, but rather evaluated in terms of whether they are 'westernized' or 'pro-western' (both tropes imply a distinction between the West and Central and Eastern Europe).\textsuperscript{62} For example, transitology distinguishes between Central Europe and Eastern Europe, and EU and NATO enlargement have further accentuated that distinction. Wedel observes that in the early- to mid-nineties, having to deal with Central European states as aid recipients quite confused the western development community, because development experts could not easily characterize these states as underdeveloped.\textsuperscript{63} To solve this dilemma, these experts divided the post-socialist countries into two groups: those in need of a “catch-up” and those that were still “underdeveloped.” As the frontier of development advice has moved east, a similar layering was applied to the former Soviet republics. Wæver claims that such layering of the East -- and hence of Europe -- has been very effective in ‘disciplining’ Central and Eastern Europe, because it keeps the door of Europe cracked, not closed.

With the possibility of drawing on the classical uncertainty about the eastern boundary of Europe, the EU manages to place nobody as non-

\textsuperscript{60} To make more of a point of where the fault-lines of political interests lie, often times the division of Europe becomes four-fold: (Western) Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia. The Southern part of Europe (including the Yugoslav successor states, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania) is often also projected as yet another (fifth) segment of Europe. Just as before in the case of Central Europe, a combination of both old and new name denominates this region, under ‘South Eastern’ Europe. See also John Agnew, “How Many Europes? The European Union, Eastward Enlargement and Uneven Development” \textit{European Urban and Regional Studies} 2001, 8(1), 29-38; A. Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity” \textit{European Urban and Regional Studies} 2001, 8(1), 7-28; \textbf{Hudson, 2001}

\textsuperscript{61} I. Neumann, 1999

\textsuperscript{62} J. Wedel, 2001

\textsuperscript{63} ibid., p. 19
European but everybody as more or less European, more or less close to the centre (of Europe and of Europeanness).\(^64\)

Membership is not denied but deferred -- until a particular state becomes fully European. Europe thereby becomes a temporal as opposed to a spatial category: everyone can be European at some later stage of development. This claim is problematic not only because of its evolutionary framework, but also because it does not recognize that the layering of Eastern Europe is also spatial. The Europeanness to be achieved and the East to be escaped from are still demarcated spatially.

The layering of Eastern Europe has not undermined the conceptualization of the accession states in terms of proximity to or distance from a center of Europeanness. For example, there is now a notable international relations literature on the emerging neo-medieval or imperial organization of Europe. It conceives Europe as a series of concentric spheres: insiders, semi-insiders, semi-outsiders, close outsiders and complete outsiders.\(^65\) This imagery has attracted attention for its challenge to the modernist assumption of homogenous or homogenizing space.\(^66\) For the purposes of this paper, it is significant also because it explicitly codifies different parts of Europe in terms of distance from the center. Agnew (2001) points to a similar theme of concentric spheres of influence emerging in the EU enlargement discourse: a neoliberal theme that is accepting and naturalizing wider differences of income levels among the member states as beneficial to Europe's global competitiveness. For Agnew, the neoliberal ideology bolsters the geographical taxonomy of an integrated Europe, a semi-integrated Central Europe, and an Eastern Europe to be used as a resource but excluded from a discussion of membership. I would add here that the opposite is true as well: the neoliberal ideology relies on the geographical taxonomy of Europe and Eastern Europe.

\(^64\) O. Wæver, 2000, p. 263
\(^66\) This hierarchical image starkly reminds us of the concentrical circles of class relations in feudal Europe. As Western Europe replicated this political and economic system with its colonies, Marxist analysis keenly pointed out the unequal relations and exchange between the West European center, the semi-periphery, and periphery. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1974). For a review on the contemporary reinvigoration of the mediaeval imagery, see P. Aalto, “A European Geopolitical Subject in the Making: EU, Russia and the Kaliningrad Question” Geopolitics 2002, 7(3), 143-174
The continuum of Europe and Eastern Europe allows individual places to gradually ‘escape’ Eastern Europe if they manage to discursively shift themselves closer to Europe. Such a discursive relocation has happened to some extent already. While in the early 1990s, post-communist countries of the former Soviet block were framed as East European, today several of them are Central European. Over the 1990s, Central Europe expanded, as first the three Visegrad countries of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, and then Slovakia, Slovenia, and Croatia embarked on demarcating themselves as Central European. It now goes without much explanation that Central Europe is in some unspecified yet obvious way more European than Eastern Europe.67

To escape Eastern Europe, accession countries need to define Eastern Europe, and in so doing, they reproduce it. The framework of Europe vs. Eastern Europe is therefore not simply imposed on accession countries; it is also used by these countries to distinguish themselves from states further east, and to thereby prove their European credentials. Central Europe was carved out of Eastern Europe in large measure by Central European intellectuals of statecraft. These intellectuals have profusely stressed Central Europe's Europeanness so as to distinguish it from the supposedly less European Eastern Europe. In the Baltic countries, local intellectuals of statecraft likewise frame Russia as somewhat Asiatic so as to project the Baltic states as inherently European (Miniotaite, 2003). A similar rush away from connotations of Eastness can be observed in the former Yugoslavia, where first Slovenia and then Croatia started projecting the East further south so as to shift themselves into Central Europe. Thus, the western othering of east-central Europe, and the Central European othering of Eastern Europe are mutually constituted: both require the other for legitimacy.

As Central Europe’s chief reason for being is to be distinct from Eastern Europe, evoking Central Europe also evokes the East. It both reaffirms a country's Europeanness and simultaneously places it on the margin of Europe. Central Europe therefore functions not only as a project to exclude others, but also ‘as a means for a people worried about their own European credentials to retrieve a place at the heart of European politics and culture’ (Patterson, 2003, p. 128). Central European intellectuals’ eagerness to participate in the othering of Eastern Europe is a part of this process of flexible othering. One could argue that, being in positions of weakness, Central Europe has no other choice. As Europe is

framed in opposition to the East (of Europe), accession countries have an incentive to align themselves with the 'right' side rather than challenge the very framework. As these countries' legitimacy to speak is constituted within the discourse of Eastern Europe, they can gain legitimacy only by 'escaping' Eastern Europe. The implication here is not that Central European countries passively internalize western discourses, but that they use these discourses to gain some leverage with the West.

CONCLUSION: THE NEXUS OF SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE EAST

How are the categories of security, development, and Eastern Europe are linked within the EU integration discourse? This paper highlighted their nexus of as rhetorically linked, based on the premise of securing Europe. The flexible othering of Central and Eastern Europe is enabled by the assumption that Eastern Europe represents a potential source of insecurity to Europe. This assumption underpins not only western accounts of Central and Eastern Europe, but also Central European accounts of Eastern Europe. It persists because it is a prerequisite for the construction of Europe and the EU as a secure and stable. Eastern Europe is therefore perpetually on the road to Europe and perpetually being secured by Europe. Some parts of Central and Eastern Europe have been able to partly escape the predicament of Eastern Europe, while others are simultaneously re-plotted further east. Europe therefore cannot be 'whole and free' unless the category of Eastern Europe is dismantled. This cannot be done, however, because discourses of European security are dependent on it. While the re-inscription of Eastern Europe is not uncontested either in Western or in Central and Eastern Europe, it still endures as a banal common-sense assumption.

The reframing of security in more holistic (soft or positive peace) terms and the layering of the East (of Europe) into Central Europe and Eastern Europe has not undermined this edifice, but has made it more flexible. The notion of an insecure Eastern Europe no longer denotes an antagonistic Soviet sphere, but instead refers to a more vague insecure periphery. It functions as a floating signifier that can be attached to a variety of places and situations as needed. Yet the layering of Eastern Europe and the diffusion of insecurity further reify the

68 Accession countries have also resisted this layering of otherness. For example, Central European countries have resisted strict application of the Schengen visa regime on their eastern borders on the grounds that this would restrict cross-border trade and economically harm their border regions. These efforts have been mostly unsuccessful, however, because the accession countries are bound by EU regulations (see Bialasiewicz & O'Loughlin, 2002; Grabbe, 2000).
Europe against which the various Eastern Europes are defined, and further latch the signifier 'Europe' on the signified 'European Union.'

However, quite regardless whether there are real threats, security has very real and tangible political effects as it makes some policies possible and others impossible. We should therefore not discard security rhetoric as mere paranoia, but take seriously it as a rhetorical pillar of policy-making. A closer engagement with security studies would allow us to re-focus from intents to effects: from what security means or ought to mean, or what the EU or the member states intend with any particular policy, to how security functions in the discourse of EU enlargement. It would offer insights not simply into foreign and security polices, but also into a host of domestic policies -- such as immigration, citizenship, and minority rights, to name some -- that rely heavily on assumptions about security. As security rhetoric has become ever more pervasive across Europe in the post-September 11 political climate, that rhetoric should be subjected to a more sustained and theoretically informed scrutiny.

In particular, analyses of EU enlargement need to engage with the production of security and development in the accession countries. The notion of the insecure Eastern Europe is not simply projected onto Central and Eastern Europe from the West, but also reproduced in the accession countries themselves. Conversely, security discourses in the accession countries will not be simply subsumed by 'European' ones after EU enlargement; rather, these discourses will also influence Europe-wide conceptions of security. We therefore must ask not only the general question of how Eastern Europe and security are constructed in Europe, but also the more specific question of how the accession countries participate in this construction. A focus on the accession countries would move the discussion beyond the generalized ‘Europe’ and ‘Eastern Europe’, and lay bare the specific demarcations and political functions of these categories. It would allow us to explicate the multiple overlapping scales on which the notion of the insecure Eastern Europe is produced and contested.

Second, the nexus of security, development, and othering points to the potential of fruitful engagement between East European studies and postcolonial theory. There is now an emerging literature that highlights parallels between contemporary problematizations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former European colonies. These largely conceptual and exploratory studies have not

been substantiated with detailed empirical material, however. If we accept that there are several kinds of colonality and postcoloniality, then the lack of an explicit colonial experience does not necessarily preclude the relevance of postcolonial theory to east-central Europe. Rather, an engagement with postcolonial theory could offer fresh perspectives to the peculiar form of governmentality that is effected with respect to the 'eastern' applicants of the European Union. Just as an engagement with the construction of security would allow us to step outside the security rhetoric and to investigate the production of that very category, an engagement with postcoloniality would allow us to examine the production of the category of Europe. It would not collapse Central and Eastern Europe into a generalized postcolonial world but would rather help us to expose EU enlargement as a particular kind of power relationship. It would illuminate the ways in which the EU is a constitutive center of important societal processes outside of it. It would make it possible to compare Central and Eastern Europe to other peripheral regions of Europe, such as southern Italy, Ireland or Greece, that have historically functioned as Europe’s internal Others, and it would thereby illuminate the link between othering and development discourses within Europe. It would thereby enable us to situate Central and Eastern Europe in the broader critique of development in a more sustained fashion.

Sparke, “Between Post-Colonialism and Cross-Border Regionalism” Space and Polity 2002 6(2) pp. 203-213

71 B. J. Moore-Gilbert argues that because there are many different forms and histories of colonization, there are going to be many different degrees, forms and histories of postcoloniality (Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics (New York, NY; Verso, 1997) p.11). While these differences must be respected, research on postcoloniality should not be a kind of ‘beauty parade’ in which the competitors are ranked as to who are the most ‘truly’ postcolonial subjects (see also Verdery, 2002).