In the summer of 1952, novelist Pat Frank got a call from the United Nations asking him to make a documentary film about Korea. Frank had never been to Korea, nor did he speak the language or have any special knowledge about the Pacific Rim. But the previous year he had published a novel about the Korean War called *Hold Back the Night*, an accomplishment that apparently qualified him, at least in the eyes of the United Nation’s Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), to script a film about the war and its effects on the peninsula. Frank accepted, and recounted his time in Korea in his next book, *The Long Way Round* (1953). Early on, he explains his charge by quoting the agent general of the UNKRA, who requested that the projected film “show what has happened to the people of South Korea, what can be done to help them, and tell why it must be done. Thirty million people have been ground into the muck and dust of Asia on this battleground. The struggle is not only between armies, but between systems, ours below the 38th Parallel, theirs above. Which system is better? Which half of Korea will recover first?” (Frank 1953, 23).

Today, a more pointed question might be why an American novelist with only a glancing understanding of Korea and the Korean War could be presumed capable of representing the story of thirty million Koreans. Part of the answer rests in the way the agent general represents the “struggle,” a figuration that both emblematizes how Asia was conceived in the early Cold War rhetorical frame and that echoes Frank’s own treatment in *Hold Back the Night*. Perhaps the agent general appreciated the way Frank (1951, 164) had conceptualized the war in his novel: “It
was a goddam shame,” thinks the hero, that an American soldier could get “blown to shreds by a
Russian shell out of a Russian barrel fired from a Russian tank, when [he] had never had a
chance to shoot back at Russians.” Like the agent general’s questions, such a lament glosses over
the specifics of the Korean situation by emphasizing that the war is relevant to Americans only
when viewed as a proxy battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Jodi Kim (2010,
147) has recently articulated this idea by noting that the Truman administration “could not and
did not interpret the North’s ‘attack’ on the South on June 25, 1950, as part of a continuum in
Korea’s own local efforts at reunification and decolonization.” Such myopia was a result, Kim
argues, of the “Cold War ‘scene of persuasion’ [which] convinced the United States that the
North’s incursion on the South was Soviet inspired and sponsored. . . . [Truman’s] reasoning
relied on an operation of substitution and metonymy: Korea itself was not significant, but Korea
as a Cold War proxy and metonymic example of what could happen to the rest of the world was
of vital significance” (147–48).1 Because the logic underlying US intervention in Korea relied
on substitution and metonymy, the war was from the outset defined as a “limited war,” a mere
battle in the greater Cold War, a figuration that explains why Russians seem both invisible and
omnipresent to Frank’s protagonist in Hold Back the Night. That the Korean War was officially
“limited” in scope but simultaneously represented a battle for world dominance became a
widespread cultural conundrum and an entry point for writers like Frank, who grappled with the
war’s meaning relative to the United States’ post-WWII, neoimperialist role in the world.

The paradoxical position of the Korean War indeed requires new ways of thinking about
fiction that seems at once to uphold Anders Stephanson’s idea of the Cold War as “not only a US
term but a US project” (2012, 26), while still invested in the effects of this project on the rest of
the world. Such work has already begun, as since about 2000 US Cold War literary and cultural
studies has undergone an important shift in focus from analyses of domestic repression signaled by the Red Scare or fears of atomic annihilation, to explorations of how best to theorize the global Cold War.\(^2\) Influential work in the 1990s helped us understand how texts that do not seem at first blush political can indeed be read as manifestations or reflections of Cold War politics.\(^3\) Alan Nadel’s *Containment Culture* (1995), for example, shows that an important effect of the containment narrative—cultural stories related to the theory that the United States should contain the spread of Communism abroad—was that the world was rendered for Americans in bipolar terms: “The story of containment had derived its logic from the rigid major premise that the world was divided into two monolithic camps, one dedicated to promoting the inextricable combination of capitalism, democracy, and (Judeo-Christian) religion, and one seeking to destroy that ideological amalgamation by any means” (4). Nadel’s observation, that containment logic depends on a rigid us-versus-them ideological stance, proved a valuable starting point for thinking about the literary-cultural dimensions of the Cold War. Yet, as others have pointed out, such a model only partially explains phenomena like the Korean War and the literatures that engage it.\(^4\)

As suggested by Jodi Kim’s point about substitution and metonymy, reading Korean War literature through the containment model would require that Korea be viewed only as a proxy, as a site of potential Communist expansion that must therefore be contained and closed off, even at the cost of losing lives. Challenging this conceptualization, in *Ends of Empire* (2010), Kim explores how the Cold War was “triangulated” in Asia, and suggests that the Korean War presented an epistemological problem whose complexities were realized in literature. In the course of demonstrating the variety of ways Asian American literature pushed back against US Cold War enterprises, she argues that the Korean War represents “a complex problem of
knowledge production. . . . The Korean War appears not simply as a congealed historical episode that is given narrative form after-the-event, but also as a Cold War epistemology in the making. Such a figuring reveals how the Korean War is not only an epistemological object of historical investigation, but also how it was—and continues to be—itself an epistemological project generating a certain Cold War knowledge that attempts to foreclose alternative or ‘nonaligned’ knowledges’ (145). I understand Kim to mean that because the Korean War was the first hot battle of the Cold War, its “complex problem” was how to negotiate a real-life battle in a specific locale that was being fought under the auspices of a larger war whose most obvious contours were abstract and theoretical. If we agree with Kim that the war was “an epistemological project generating a certain Cold War knowledge,” then we see that those writing about the war, whether journalists, fiction writers, or others, were not only participating in this project, but were indeed theorizing what the Cold War meant as it involved actual nations and actual people. As I explore below, one result of such theorizing was that writers found themselves caught in competing and self-contradictory rhetorical situations. Even a novelist like Frank, who tended to view US neoimperialism positively, found himself using Korea as an occasion, as Kim puts it, to “foreclose alternative or ‘nonaligned’ knowledges”—that is, to hammer the meaning of Korea into the bipolar Cold War frame rather than view it as a more localized political phenomenon. In other words, the project of writing about Korea in the Cold War frame is the project of foreclosing “alternative or ‘nonaligned’” knowledges, and yet the very specificity of the Korean situation demanded that such alternative knowledges be recognized in order to accurately represent what was happening, even in a fictional scenario.

From a Cold War literary and cultural-studies perspective, then, the Korean War (1950–1953) is a distinctive moment in US cultural history. Asking how and whether there is such a
thing as “Korean War literature” helps us understand not only how the war violated the logic of the Cold War rhetorical frame sketched above, but also how this literature begins to work through the distance between state rhetoric of benevolent global intervention and a grittier if unofficial reality. In specifying Korean War literature as a category—different from, say, Asian American literature or Korean American literature—I aim to make visible a body of work that theorizes the meaning of the Korean War in relation to the Cold War frame. To illustrate how this theorization worked over time, I will suggest that there are two broad phases of Korean War literature: the first phase is work written in the 1950s and early 1960s generally by white, male Americans who fought in the war, reported on the war, or had some other ties to the US military. Work of this phase renders the Korean War in terms of the bipolar global imaginary described above: even as this imaginary is inherently reductive, writers of the first phase understood Korea’s meaning only in terms of US-Communist rivalry. The second phase, marked by Richard E. Kim’s The Martyred (1964), but not gaining traction until the 1980s and 1990s, tends to be written by first- or second-generation Korean Americans who either experienced the war directly or explored the cultural memory of a war that, some scholars have argued, is a precondition of the very idea of Korean Americanness. Work of this phase is characterized by an explicit exploration and critique of the rhetorical structuring that situated the meaning of the Korean War relative to the bipolar rivalry, and as such is marked by meta-engagements with the Cold War rhetorical frame that shift the meaning of the war away from US claims about it. Such an archive, though only legible retroactively, at once broadens the rubric of Cold War literature to include the literatures of specific conflicts and challenges the naming power of that very framework to dictate where meaning inheres in an event such as the Korean War.
In the following pages, I discuss Frank’s *Hold Back the Night* as a test case for how first-phase writers located the meaning of the Korean War as being always relative to US ideas about the Cold War. In addition to Frank’s work, I look at novels that that complicate or extend this frame, pausing over Francis Pollini’s *Night* (1960) and Richard Condon’s *The Manchurian Candidate* (1959). By reading these works together as “first-phase” writing, we begin to see that over the course of the 1950s, one can detect an interest in the darker sides of US neoimperial power, even as the Cold War frame remains fixed in place. Such an interest is amplified in work of the second phase that questions and dismantles the explanatory power of the frame itself: this phase starts with Kim’s *The Martyred*, is further exemplified by Ty Pak’s short-story collection *Guilt Payment* (1983) and Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s *Dictee* (1982), and continues through to books such as Chang-rae Lee’s *Native Speaker* (1995) and *The Surrendered* (2010), as well as Susan Choi’s *The Foreign Student* (1998). As I touch on in the conclusion, the shift from first- to second-phase theorizations of the war helps explain why it has recently become de rigueur for even non–Korean American novelists to treat the conflict as a historical episode that stands for the United States’ ill-conceived global interventions during the Cold War, as happens in Philip Roth’s *Indignation* (2008) and Jayne Anne Phillips’s *Lark and Termite* (2009). Comparing this admittedly disparate and far-flung grouping allows us to see that first-phase writing exemplifies the Cold War rhetorical frame, even as the dictates of this frame seem increasingly absurd, whereas second-phase writing interrogates this frame and challenges the notion that the Korean War’s meaning is coupled exclusively with US political imperatives.

The First Phase
In one of the best-known early Korean War novels, *The Bridges of Toko-Ri* (1953), written by Pat Frank’s friend James Michener, readers learn that the Korean War called for “special rules” of decorum not seen in other wars: “They [Americans] must not . . . admit that they were fighting Russians, nor must they even indicate that any of our men were being killed. In this special war there were special rules to keep the people back in America from becoming worried” (55). As in Frank’s work, these “special rules” hold only if the Korean War is viewed as a proxy battle in the larger Cold War, a view that made Korea “symbolic” according to the logic of substitution and metonymy described by Kim. As reflected in the notion that Americans must not “admit” they were fighting Russians, the Korean War was special from the US point of view because it was a physical manifestation of a potentially limitless ideological struggle. This idea is everywhere evident in early 1950s rhetoric; consider, for example, the 1952 remarks of Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas (1952, 15), a self-styled expert on the Far East: “The fight in Korea is symbolic of the struggle going on all over Asia and Africa. It is the struggle for the independence of nations, for the equality of people regardless of race or color, for the right of every people to their own culture, their own religion, their own way of life.” This is a telling formulation, because though Douglas argues for racial equality and democratic freedom, he can only conceptualize such ideals in terms of the Cold War frame: Korea must be “symbolic” and therefore a test case for the success or failure of American-style equality and democracy abroad.

In their premise that Korea was important because of its symbolic value in the Cold War frame, Pat Frank’s books illustrate the cultural work that first-phase Korean War literature performed. A *New York Times* reviewer, for one, saw Frank’s *Hold Back the Night* as a “propaganda barrage” filled with “slicked-up and sometimes recruiting-poster dialogue” (Herbert
Mitgang, “Retreat in Korea,” March 9, 1952). He was able to say this because the novel echoes large cultural narratives by connecting the Korean War to the mythic American past, as though it is merely another frontier to be conquered. In the climactic scene, for example, the ragtag band of American soldiers dig in for an attack right out of the movies: “They charged down the slope of the hill, yelling. It was ridiculous. It was like an old film of the U.S. Cavalry, pennons flying, routing the redskins. It was San Juan Hill, and Hill 609, and Washington’s ragged Continentals rallying at Trenton. It made no military sense at all” (Frank 1951, 232–33). By drawing a line from the Korean War to the American Revolution, Frank underscores the high stakes of the present conflict, and yet the adjective ridiculous pointedly echoes his earlier description of the general situation: “This war between the free world and the slave world could carry on for generations, as had other wars, but this one was more important, because it might decide things forever. This thing in Korea didn’t look like much. It looked ridiculous. . . . Yet it would be decisive. . . . Here in Korea, somebody’s will was going to be broken” (163). Central to this seemingly untenable view that a band of cowboys “might decide things forever” is Korea’s status as symbol, requiring as it does the assumption that the Korean War represents a larger, more important war, a “ridiculous” figuration that means Koreans themselves are diminished almost to the point of invisibility.

This compartmentalizing of Koreans is perhaps a necessary consequence of Frank’s treatment of the war as a conflict that does not “look like much,” but that is so profound in importance that it could well “decide things forever.” Indeed, although the novel ends on a patriotic note that might seem morally just to its dedicatees, “The United States Marines,” a middle chapter betrays ambivalence about the American presence in Korea, even while Frank resolutely clings to the Cold War frame. When one soldier, Couzens, is captured, his
interrogation by a Red Chinese officer, Colonel Chu, allows Frank to explore the incommensurability of a small war that could determine the fate of the world. As Couzens argues, “America is fighting Russia. The Russians don’t have the guts to fight us, man to man, bomb for bomb, so they send you against us” (104–5). Once again, the importance of the “ridiculous” war is asserted—to promote American-style democratic freedom—and yet Frank then has both Chu and Couzens question such freedom. Chu advances a caricatured Marxist position: “We fight for the liberation of all oppressed peoples, including those in the United States. . . . You are oppressed, although perhaps you don’t know it. You have been hypnotized, drugged by material things.” By imagining the opposition in this way, Frank offers a critique of American norms that depends on viewing Korea as an arena in which US-style capitalism confronts Soviet-style Communism. The notion that the Korean War could be construed as a civil war or have meaning as a localized conflict is not even on the map of political possibility.

At the other end of the 1950s, Olympia Press published an experimental novel about the Korean War, Francis Pollini’s Night, which maintains the Cold War frame but is more stridently critical than Frank’s work. The plot centers on Marty Landi, a working-class soldier from Pennsylvania, and Ching, the Columbia-educated Chinese Communist officer tasked with breaking Landi’s will.11 The theoretical underpinning of Ching’s attempted indoctrination of Landi is a Frankfurt School–style critique of American culture. “The Ad-Mass culture,” Ching sneers, “seduced by itself, wallowing in profound, dangerous Ignorance. The myth is: Free Individuals, Liberty. The reality is: most tyrannized people in the world. Suffocated by Ad-Mass. They know nothing, feel nothing, thinking nothing about the Truths of Life” (237). This argument works by reversing popular American conceptions about life under Communism: it is
the Americans who are made to suffer for the collective, the abstracted “mass” or “Ad-Mass” that represents a capitalist version of totalitarian ideology.

Ching’s argument is crystallized when he questions the basic idea of “reality” by elaborating the idea that the United States’ “real bosses” are “the Big Corporation heads,” by enumerating the lack of public funds for “schools, social services,” and by claiming that “Farmers are paid not to grow food, huge surpluses rot in warehouses—while two thirds of the world is living on the starvation borderline” (Pollini [1960] 1961, 239). However exaggerated, these are features of mid-century American life that are hard to dismiss no matter one’s politics, especially when Ching remarks that a “tremendous armaments expenditure props the whole thing up.” In Night, as in Frank’s works, the Korean War is being fought as a physical manifestation of an ideological Cold War, but Pollini does not offer any positive explanation for the ideological battle. What remains most vivid is a demonization of the American system, which Ching levels not only with a claim (Americans “haven’t the slightest idea what reality is”), but also with reasoned supports for this claim. Noteworthy here is the argument’s specific content, and the fact that it is advanced with comparative rationality—especially when held against the actions of the desperate American captives (who, to take one example, behead one of their fellow soldiers who has signed on with the Chinese indoctrination [294]). In Night, the American presence in Korea is figured negatively, yet such figuration is only possible in terms of the ideological difference between capitalism and Communism, a situation that underscores how first-phase writers, even when mounting social critique, did not conceive of the Korean War beyond the US-centered Cold War frame.

Before discussing second-phase Korean War literature, I will pause briefly over an illustrative transitional novel, Richard Condon’s The Manchurian Candidate (1959), which most
people today probably remember from the 1962 John Frankenheimer film adaptation. With its flashback sequences set in Korea and Manchuria, *The Manchurian Candidate* has become the best-known example of Korean War literature; and yet—tellingly about the visibility of the war to most Americans—both the novel and film are remembered almost exclusively as potent examples of Cold War cultural logic. The plot follows a group of American soldiers who are captured during the Korean War, taken north of the Yalu River to Manchuria, and brainwashed by a Chinese “operator,” Yen Lo. The brainwashing focuses on Raymond Shaw, who is conditioned to become an ideal assassin because he will not remember what he has done; when the brainwashing is complete, the men are conditioned to praise Shaw’s heroic actions, which earn him the Medal of Honor. Back in the States, Shaw gets increasing attention as a result of both the medal and his stepfather, Senator Johnny Iselin (modeled on Joseph McCarthy). In the final pages of the novel, Shaw’s secret-agent handlers (the chief among whom turns out to be his own mother, Eleanor) program him to assassinate the presidential nominee so that Iselin, who has the vice-presidential nomination, can take his place and become the titular candidate, unknowingly controlled by the Chinese and the Soviets. The relevance of Korea has been so diminished that it is only legible in terms of the Cold War.

This structure originates in the novel, in which the Korean War is mainly a pretext for Condon to project Western fears about the dangers and mysteries of the Orient (represented by Yen Lo and dominated by China, not Korea), and to help him skewer McCarthyism (represented by Iselin). He signals the flimsiness of the geopolitical context early on, when Korea is associated with cardboard cutouts: Shaw’s mother, trying to bolster Iselin’s image at home, arranges for “a life-sized cut-out of Johnny to be forwarded to Seoul. General MacArthur was in the area. Could Johnny arrange for a picture of the two of them [Shaw and MacArthur] with arms
around the photographic cut-out of Johnny, as she could guarantee that this would get the widest kind of coverage?” (Condon [1959] 1988, 17). To have a cardboard cut-out of Iselin sent to far-off Seoul suggests that the war is relevant mainly as a prop for a photo opportunity, underscoring the narrative that Korea is only important to the United States—whose baser tendencies are embodied in the two-dimensional Iselin—as proxy. Indeed, despite the novel’s title, the presence of the Korean War is limited by the structure of the narrative itself: it exists in flashbacks and dreams, in the deep recesses of Shaw’s mind, yet it informs everything in the novel’s present, even naming the puppet politician who will replace the assassinated candidate. Paradoxically, then, the Korean War is everywhere and nowhere in the novel— it occasions all the action and makes possible characters’ unconscious estrangement from themselves. But the war is never realized as a specific historical phenomenon, let alone one that might have meaning beyond the crafty Communists toying with the minds of the American foot soldiers of democracy.

When read in light of other works already discussed, *The Manchurian Candidate* is significant as late first-phase Korean War literature precisely because it appears to hold the conflict at a distance, but then proceeds to demonstrate how the war vindicates the Cold War present. The novel’s caricature of paranoid anti-Communism not only shows how the Korean War was absorbed by the Cold War, but it again underscores the difficulty first-phase writers had reconciling the Korean War with public narratives about the Cold War, a difficulty that would become the thematic focus of much second-phase writing.

**The Second Phase**
I have argued that first-phase Korean War literature assumed that the war had meaning only as a symbol of the Cold War struggle between the US and Soviet/Chinese Communism, yet even as writers composed novels depicting the war based on this premise, they had difficulty sustaining the larger cultural narrative of a bipolar world imaginary in the Korean context. For a new generation of American writers—most, but not all, of Korean descent—the Korean War is a signal event of the twentieth century. In their work, then, the war radiates out, its influence felt widely, rather than being reduced to a military conflict figured, from a US point of view, through the rhetoric of “limited war.”

In her overview of Korean American literature, Elaine Kim (2004, 13) singles out the war as the defining feature not only of this literature, but of the very fact of Korean Americanness: “The Korean War shaped the most intimate aspects of material and psychic life for tens of millions of Koreans, including millions of Korean Americans, touching even those born long after the armistice or living on distant continents. Displaced and dislocated people have migrated to the very imperial center that disrupted their lives.” This description could serve as an explanation of the differences between the treatment of the Korean War seen in the preceding pages and the uses and interpretations of the war written by later generations of writers, especially Korean American writers. If for Frank, Pollini, and many others, the Cold War frame required that the Korean War be viewed as a far-off conflict that could have decided the fate of the world, for second-phase writers, it was a central trauma of the twentieth century. Crudely put, from a Korean point of view, the Cold War names something that not only occurred but had long-term, far-reaching consequences, whereas from the US point of view, the Cold War often names something that might have happened (so that nuclear brinkmanship is frightening because it might have led to worldwide devastation). Thus, the Korean War’s twinned profundity and
apparent erasure in the States contributed to its potency and ongoing relevance, and it is probably not a stretch to say that there would be no Korean American literature without the Korean War.

One way to parse the distinction between first- and second-phase writing, then, is to note that while the first phase assumes that the Cold War frame offers the best explanation for the Korean War—however tortured such explanations become in fiction—second-phase writers challenge the frame itself. This works most visibly when second-phase writers offer another side of the story, a Korean perspective that complements and perhaps corrects the limited American perspective. Consider, for instance, one subgenre of first-phase novel that concerns the then-new phenomenon of jet warfare; both Michener’s *The Bridges of Toko-Ri* and James Salter’s *The Hunters* (1956) were best sellers made into feature films, and both follow the fortunes of American jet pilots. In these and other novels, much of the focus is on the impressiveness of the jets themselves, and on the American pilots’ personal struggles; as Salter writes of his hero, “Free of the gravitational forces of reality, he sat in the sunshine and looked out over a crystal empire” (229). In Michener’s *The Bridges of Toko-Ri*, readers encounter a similarly abstracted “empire” subjugated by American military superiority: “Ecstatically the two jets zoomed to 26,000. Far below them the savage, cheated mountains of Korea began to assume a beautiful countenance” (90). In such views, Korea resonates only in relation to US interests.

With such romantic paeans to jet warfare among its literary forebears, it is hard not to see Chang-rae Lee’s *The Surrendered* (2010) as a reworking of such tropes. *The Surrendered* opens with one of its main characters, June, a child in Korea during the war, losing her sister and mother to a bombing run made by one of these jets. First June hears “the roar of two silvery jet planes flashing by overhead” and then she is caught in a massive explosion (23). Groping around near the crater, she “could not find a single sign of her mother or sister. There was not a scrap of
their clothing, not a lock of their hair. It was as if they had kited up into the sky, become the last wisps of the jet trails now diffusing with a southerly breeze, disappearing fast above her” (24). Such a scene is hardly ecstatic or beautiful, and when read against these earlier jet novels, it is clear Lee wants to rewrite the subgenre of Korean War novel that focuses on the roaring of “silvery jet planes” to the exclusion of the horrors being wrought on the ground. The simile underscores the ways Korean lives were absorbed into American fantasies.

This basic shift in emphasis marks the second phase of Korean War literature, a shift that becomes about the very terms with which the war had circulated in the United States, and how such terms affected the framing of the war in Korea. Richard E. Kim’s *The Martyred* (1964) is exemplary in this regard. Born in what is now North Korea in 1932, Kim worked with US intelligence during the war and wrote his novel about intelligence and counterintelligence after moving to the States in the mid-1950s. His novel is typical of second-phase work that posits an important disjunction between what the United States claimed about the war to Koreans and what these writers imagined the war actually meant to the Koreans who experienced it. When read in light of the history of Korean War literature sketched here, we might counterintuitively read Kim as an inheritor of writers like Frank and Pollini: whereas in books like *Hold Back the Night* and *Night* cracks began to show in the official accounts of the war, Kim begins from a premise of disjunction, and the plot is structured around an exploration of how the Cold War rhetorical frame tried to render the Korean War meaningful only relative to US political imperatives, a connection the novel systematically dismantles.

*The Martyred* is set in North and South Korea as the Americans retreated from Pyongyang after the Chinese entered the war in 1951; the plot is motivated by Communists’ murder of twelve ministers who refused to renounce their faith. The protagonist, Captain Lee, is
a South Korean intelligence officer tasked with investigating why two ministers, Hann and Shin, were not killed, and determining whether they pledged allegiance to North Korea. In this regard, the plot develops like a detective novel as Lee has to negotiate all the truths, half-truths, and cultural symbolism that we have seen circulating in different ways in other works. When, for instance, Colonel Chang first explains to Lee the urgency of his charge, he emphasizes the symbolic importance of the murdered ministers, an importance predicated on a stable Cold War frame: “The twelve martyrs are a great symbol. They are a symbol of the suffering Christians and their eventual spiritual triumph. We mustn’t let the martyrs down. We must let everyone witness their spiritual victory over the Reds” (R. Kim 1964, 74). The “twelve martyrs” thus become a writ-small example of the logic motivating claims like Justice Douglas’s that Korea’s importance was “symbolic.”

Kim has Colonel Chang represent the US perspective by insisting on the “martyrs” symbolism, for they are symbolic mainly in the Cold War international arena: “You are suggesting,” Lee paraphrases, “that it [the death of the ministers] may be good material for propaganda . . . a grave case of religious persecution by the Communists. Of international significance . . . particularly in America. . . . We may be able to exhibit to the entire world the Korean chapter in the history of Christian martyrdom” (R. Kim 1964, 18–19). This meta-engagement with the symbolic politics of the Korean scenario acknowledges that the meaning of Korea was premised on “substitution and metonymy” when viewed in light of US Cold War imperatives. But whereas a novel like Hold Back the Night is content to let this premise exhaust the meaning of “Korea” or “the Korean War”—and would endorse the idea that the war is a vivid exhibition of “the history of Christian martyrdom”—The Martyred interrogates the framework that makes this perspective seem absolute. Indeed, unlike many works of the first
phase, which attempt (but fail) to maintain uniform claims about the Korean War as a noble Cold War venture, *The Martyred* thematizes an exploration of such mythology—what Lee calls “propaganda”—in order to disentangle the Cold War frame from what Kim takes to be reality. This strategy is evident later when Chang insists to Lee: “What you don’t understand is that there should be no doubt about the glory of the martyrs. They were good and saintly. Why? Because they are martyrs. Because they were murdered by the Reds. It is as simple as that” (126). This “simple” tautology only makes sense in the US Cold War frame (which assumes any “Red” is ipso facto evil); by unraveling this tautology over the course of the novel, Kim thereby unravels the frame itself, something a novel of the first phase would be unlikely to do.

As the novel turns on various scenes that explore the Cold War frame, readers encounter a more forceful articulation of the muted criticisms from the first phase. When Lee and Chang debate the legacies of the dead ministers, and ask whether it is ethical to perpetuate a noble lie (telling people that the ministers all maintained their faith steadfastly when in fact they did not), Chang poses the question in ways that move beyond the treatments found in earlier work. First, Chang offers the Americanized version of what the war symbolizes: “Can you tell all sorts of people we are fighting this war for the glorious cause of our independence, our liberty, and, to make the matter more complicated, for the interest and preservation of our democratic system of government?” (R. Kim 1964, 172). This is a distillation of the official American line, minus Korea’s symbolism on the international stage. Chang’s position articulates what he takes to be the truth of the situation; he emphasizes the “blind struggle for power among the beastly states,” by which he does not mean North and South Korea, but the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. The Cold War frame itself is figured negatively, so that “thousands of people have died and more will die in this stupid war, for nothing, for absolutely nothing, because they are just
innocent victims, helpless pawns in the arena of cold-blooded, calculating international power politics” (172–73). In this cynical view, the Korean War and the Cold War underwriting it are absurd, meaningless from the point of view of political change. *The Martyred* is thus characteristic second-phase writing that chastens the frame itself by questioning the premise that Korea was a proxy war in a larger and more important Cold War.

*The Martyred* was published when President Johnson was escalating the war in Vietnam, and the indelible presence of that other Asian war on American consciousness surely contributed to interest in Kim’s skepticism over the legitimacy of the Cold War as a pretext for US intervention in Asia. Since contemporary readers may therefore imagine that Korean War literature ought to have lots in common with Vietnam War literature, I want to emphasize a key distinction.¹⁵ It is precisely the limited impact Korea had on US national consciousness as opposed to its profound effect in Korea that distinguishes Korean War literature from Vietnam War literature. It is not for nothing that Korea is popularly known as the “Forgotten War,” eclipsed by Vietnam even as those in the early 1950s saw it as a battle for world domination. As troop deployment escalated and fighting was shown nightly on the evening news, the counterculture would balk at Johnson’s characterization of Vietnam as a “limited war” and the argument that Vietnam was the best evidence for the US government’s ethically vexed involvement around the world became the polarizing issue of the 1960s. So while the coincidence of two wars being fought by the United States in Asia under the auspices of the Cold War may invite comparison of these wars’ respective literatures, the fact that Vietnam was central to the social consciousness of the 1960s whereas Korea was forever peripheral to the 1950s suggests they are fundamentally different cultural experiences. Fiction of the second phase
is born of the Korean War’s limited impact on US public consciousness as it argues for the profound importance of the Korean War for Korea and Korean Americans.

Looking at second-phase work, we see that its dismantling of the Cold War frame encourages reflection about the way this frame submerged the Korean War in the US national consciousness. The war as a puzzling though integral feature of one’s sense of self is the subject of Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s *Dictee* (1982), a generically hybrid that explores how history, genealogy, and language intermingle to create the speaker’s subjectivity.\(^{16}\) Drawing on Western history in a very different way from Pat Frank, Cha sees the war as a “Melpomene Tragedy,” evoking the mythological figure who transmuted from muse of song to muse of tragedy, a fitting metaphor for the distances between the US Cold War understanding of the war and its realities. With a map of the divided Korea on the facing page, Cha writes: “The submission is complete. The expulsion is immediate. Not one second is lost to the replication of the totality. Total severance of the seen” ([1982] 2001, 79). Here the sense of loss is bound to what the “totality” of the Korean War signifies for Cha—hardly a proxy war whose meaning inheres elsewhere, the event for Cha becomes a frame in which she can understand herself. Following this statement, she includes a letter to her mother, which first references June 25, 1950, and elaborates the idea that parts of herself are missing due to a war that radiates outward, despite US rhetoric that would have fixed it as proxy. “Here at my return in eighteen years,” she writes, “the war is not ended. We fight the same war. We are inside the same struggle seeking the same destination. We are severed in Two by an abstract enemy an invisible enemy under the title of liberators who have conveniently named the severance, Civil War. Cold War. Stalemate” (81). So consequential is the Korean War that it binds Cha to her family history, and its various names (Civil War, Cold War, Stalemate), suggest that its complexity cannot be understood as circumscribed by the Cold
War rhetorical frame that posits Korea as metonym. For Cha, the expansive slipperiness of the war reflects her own sense of self and place in the world: hardly registering on the American national consciousness (“total severance of the seen”), the Korean War nonetheless defines her own conflicted sense of Korean Americanness and so is both literally and metaphorically “not ended,” for the strange stalemate that led to a divided Korea persisted to 1982 as it does to the present day. Dictee’s treatment of the Korean War indicates the ways it would circulate in many fictional works of the second phase, which are interested in the Cold War rhetorical frame and the damage that this frame caused to Koreans and Korean Americans.

Such a sense is reflected in the work of Ty Pak, whose *Guilt Payment* appeared a year after *Dictee*. Born in Korea in 1938, Pak experienced the war firsthand and immigrated to the United States in the mid-1960s. The novel *Cry Korea Cry* (1999) is his most fully realized depiction of the Korean War and its aftermath, following as it does the story of a mixed-race child born during the war; in its interest in recovering “forgotten” Korean War history, the novel may be compared to other works of the late 1990s such as Susan Choi’s *The Foreign Student* (1998). But it was in his fiction collection *Guilt Payment* (1983) that Pak introduced the concerns he would develop in *Cry Korea Cry*, and *Guilt Payment* marks with *Dictee* an important early moment of second-phase literature. The title story opens by yoking the personal to the political, then proposes the US Cold War frame assumed by novels of the first phase: “We had been married only eight months, Yoomi and I, when the war broke out, on Sunday, June 25, 1950” (1983, 7). This spare pronouncement introduces the idea that the newlyweds would try to abide by the US version of the war: “We were to carry on our business as usual, Syngman Rhee told us over and over on the radio. The whole affair was nothing but a border skirmish, for which the
provokers, rash North Korean communists, would be soundly thrashed by the South Korean army, backed by the U.S. with its atom bombs” (7).

The notion of the Korean War as a “border skirmish” revisits—but does not reproduce—how the war functioned as a symbol in early Cold War rhetoric: Pak emphasizes the “business as usual” palliatives of the American-installed Rhee, and the story becomes an exploration of the various registers that give lie to the Cold War frame that insists the war represents merely an extension of US power, “with its atom bombs.” The focus is not on the ways Koreans might solidify American influence in the Pacific Rim, but on the subtle psychological damages wrought on the narrator and his family. The narrator’s daughter survives the war as a baby, but now older and living in the States, her complex abrasiveness and detachment are the less-visible results of the conflict. These are the debts incurred by the narrator as a result of his experience in the war, and they exist, he realizes, in perpetuity, an idea echoed in other second-phase fiction such as Nora Okja Keller’s *Fox Girl* (2002), which has one character wondering about the fate of a friend in the aftermath of the war and thinking “These letters [to her lost friend] are my guilt payment, I suppose” (2).

Another story, “A Second Chance,” offers an even more pointed critique of Korea’s place in the Cold War frame by turning on questions of language and its representational power. In this story we learn that “Korea, the spoil of World War II, was divided and occupied by Russians and Americans, who set up their stooges to form ‘independent’ governments. There was heavy rhetoric on both sides, each claiming egalitarianism and accusing the other of exploitation and imperialism, although he [the protagonist of the story] could see no real difference between the two regimes” (Pak 1983, 111). Defined by such “heavy rhetoric,” Korea looks less like a symbol of the struggle for democracy and more like a pawn in a game viewed as rhetorical by US and
Communist players. The story follows South Korean protagonist Kichol, who is compelled into a job in Pyongyang writing Communist publications whose “unique popular style” he finds as “clumsy or heavyhanded” as US rhetoric (114). Like Captain Lee in *The Martyred*, Kichol realizes that his state-sponsored position implicates him in the active creation of official versions of the truth, and he eventually comes to see that “the fictional, the absurd and preposterous, became credible, even compelling, a potent religious truth” (132). This statement is clarified by the clumsiness of Communist propaganda, but the story—and the collection as a whole—make it clear that the criticism applies as well to the US Cold War frame. Such moments show that Pak’s work, like that of so many writers of the second phase, centers on the way the Korean War was justified via the rhetorical frame of the Cold War—and it is of course not incidental that Pak should refer to this frame as “fictional,” for with the benefit of thirty years’ hindsight, it became increasingly clear that military-historical decisions in Korea were being predicated on competing political fictions rather than universal truths.

Exploring the intersection of fictionality and mid-twentieth-century Korean history became a common thread in more recent novels of the second phase, which are profitably read as fictional engagements with Korean War historiography. Chang-rae Lee’s *Native Speaker* (1995) and Choi’s *The Foreign Student* (1998) both enjoyed critical acclaim upon their publication, and have since received the sustained attention of scholars who view them as emblematic of contemporary interest in the way the war has been represented in US culture. As mentioned earlier, Lee’s largest-scale engagement with the Korean War is *The Surrendered*, but his better-known first novel, *Native Speaker*, offers an oblique invocation of the war that resonates with its general invisibility to most non-Korean Americans. Just as Cha and Pak demonstrate how an older generation’s experience in the war shapes the consciousness of those who did not
participate directly, *Native Speaker* suggests that its protagonist, Henry Park, has been likewise shaped by the conflict that looms large for all Korean Americans. But what characterizes the treatment of the Korean War in *Native Speaker* is precisely the couching of the experience in the Americanized terms that we have seen in the first phase, which Lee introduces in order to demonstrate their inadequacy for conceptualizing political and ethnic loyalties in post–Cold War environments.

When the war is invoked explicitly, it is in terms of the textbook US Cold War version described earlier. For example, Henry recalls writing a report for a childhood social-studies course: “I read my junior encyclopedia. . . . The entry didn’t mention any Koreans except for Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung, the Communist leader. Kim was a bad Korean. . . . I didn’t want to embarrass myself in front of the class. So my report was about the threat of Communism, the Chinese Army, how MacArthur was a visionary, that Truman should have listened to him” (Lee 1995, 225). In this case, the encyclopedia entry represents the stabilizing, reductive historical framework demonstrated over the course of the novel to be false—as when Pak’s characters learn to recognize Syngman Rhee as an emblem of American puppeteering. Henry is shown to have his psychological origins in trying to be a “good Korean” by conforming to the meaning of the war ascribed by the US perspective. For Lee, this frame is relegated to the historical past, but it is also shown to be foundational; even as Henry knew at a young age that the junior encyclopedia represented a caricature of the Korean situation as dictated by the American perspective, he himself is nonetheless associated with the adjective *encyclopedic* on the first page of the novel, when his estranged wife compiles a list of his traits that share the fixating impulse of the encyclopedia. This association is especially resonant given that Henry is a professional spy, not for the CIA or other government agency, but for a small private firm that
specializes in intelligence gathering for wealthy clients. Henry has thus ironically become a “good Korean” by embodying the darker sides of US power: he operates professionally in that shadowy, unofficial realm Timothy Melley (2012) has called the “covert sphere.” The Cold War norms that first authorized the covert sphere are in *Native Speaker* distilled into the encyclopedia entry about the Korean War, which is figured as a defining feature of Henry’s relationship to US political culture—whether he knows it or not.

The impulse to explore historiography and the Korean War in fiction is perhaps nowhere stronger than in Choi’s *The Foreign Student*, which takes readers on a signposted tour of the various conceptions of the war described throughout this essay (Korean War as proxy war; Koreans as having meaning only in relation to the US Cold War frame; the war as an event so deeply personal and intangible that it can never be understood by outsiders). If we read *The Foreign Student* against the other Korean War literature discussed in this essay, we see that it shares an interest in language itself, and in how US political rhetoric in particular distorted what the war was allowed to mean in the States. Daniel Kim (2009, 552) describes this interest by noting the “disjunction between the language in which she [Choi] describes the thoughts and experiences of her Korean protagonist, Chang Ahn, and the language through which he makes sense of and experiences the war—a linguistic gap that has wider ramifications.” In second-phase fiction that takes an interest in Korean War historiography, this disjunction is more pronounced, so Lee emphasizes the limitations of the encyclopedia’s account of the Korean War, even while insisting on this version’s lingering impact on the his protagonist’s life. In *The Foreign Student*, Choi gives us the story of Korean Chang (Chuck) Ahn, who travels to Sewanee as an exchange student in 1955. Through Chuck’s story, Choi rehearses the basic rhetorical
frames in which the Korean War has conventionally been understood by most Americans, not only to demonstrate their inaccuracies, but indeed their violence.

The novel first engages the historically dominant narrative of the Korean War as Cold War proxy when Chuck gives talks to local church groups as part of his scholarship agreement. Chuck knows that the standard American understanding of the war is confined to the Cold War frame, and so he gives his audiences what they want: “He always felt hopeless, called upon to deliver a clear explanation of the war. It defied explanation. Sometimes he simply skipped over causes, and began, ‘Korea is a shape just like Florida. Yes? The top half is a Communist state, and the bottom half are fighting for democracy!’” (Choi [1998] 1999, 51). This version of the early Cold War story of Korea is intensified with Chuck’s slide presentation, which illustrates charming examples of local color as his tale emphasizes that the importance of Korea is always relative to the United States: “He genuinely liked talking about the [Inchon] landing, and MacArthur. It all made for such an exciting, simple minded, morally unambiguous story” (52).

As the novel unfolds, such images are shown to be not only “simple minded” but untrue, even if no converse “explanation” is offered. Echoing Pak’s work, readers learn that “only after installing Rhee as the Republic of Korea’s president did the Americans realize he was unmanageable: bellicose, paranoid, and so undiscouragably determined to declare war on the Communist North that the United States deliberately underequipped his security forces. Rhee’s government was repressive, incompetent, and stupendously unpopular” (Choi 1999, 64–65). As the novel follows Chuck’s time in Sewanee and his fraught relationship with a local woman, Katherine Monroe, flashback chapters describe a richer history of the war, including not only South Korea’s sometimes conflicted relationship with the United States, but also Chuck’s time
working for the US-led Public Information Office, moments that challenge the notion that Korea has meaning primarily as a Cold War proxy.

Sewanee has a cold rivalry of its own between Charles Addison, the voluble Shakespeare professor on campus, and the tight-lipped Chuck, both of whom are vying for the affection of Katherine. In the opening pages of the novel, which recount Chuck’s arrival at Sewanee, someone suggests that he take a class with Addison: “It doesn’t matter if you don’t get all the words” (Choi 1999, 11). With this opening volley, Addison’s language skills are pitted against Chuck’s so that when Chuck does take the Shakespeare course and is tasked with reciting a particularly tricky monologue, Addison remarks that it is “one of the ones I’m least able to endure hearing butchered” (15). The pointed association of language with violence recurs pages later when Chuck is perceived as less intelligent because he is less talkative: “His limited English was mistaken, as it so often is by people who have never been outside their own country, for a limited knowledge of things” (17). For those Americans Chuck encounters—most of whom have never met an Asian person—the “limited” nature of his English confirms the reductive view that the United States intervened in Korea because Koreans were incapable of helping themselves (“How did you people like that war we had for you?” asks one person he meets [234]). But as we learn more about Chuck, we discover that the view that Addison is a master of language whereas Chuck struggles with language is false. Chuck’s knowledge of the war is so intimate that he must deliberately frame his descriptions of it in Cold War terms in order for it to be palatable to American audiences. Likewise when he speaks, he limits his speech purposively: “He didn’t bother to dispel this impression [that he has limited knowledge]. He liked having a hidden advantage” (17). Like Native Speaker’s Henry Park, Chuck emerges as a figure whose power comes from his ability to manipulate and adapt—in Chuck’s case the political and cultural
narratives framing the war—an ability possible only by recognizing the frame as a frame and not confusing it with what Choi takes to be the realities of Korean history.

Although this essay represents an admittedly cursory and selective view of American fiction engaging the Korean War, I hope that by thinking about such works as “Korean War literature” I have demonstrated first that writers of the first phase so fully absorbed the US Cold War frame that they could not conceptualize the war as anything beyond a proxy battle in the larger Cold War, even if they betrayed some uneasiness about the terms of US neoimperialism; and second, that writers of the second phase tended to question the frame itself, thereby pushing the meaning of the Korean War beyond the limits of the US Cold War perspective. It is in fact only by reading more familiar recent works such as Dictee, Native Speaker, and The Foreign Student in light of forgotten or lesser-known precursors such as Hold Back the Night and Night that we can make visible the historical trajectory of both phases. This is a virtue of thinking in terms of alternative categories or frameworks such as “Korean War literature” rather than “Asian American,” “Korean American,” or “Cold War” literature. While each of these categories has its own explanatory power, like all categories each emphasizes certain features about the texts it describes. Consequently it would not make sense to read, say, Pat Frank against Susan Choi were one focusing on Korean American literature; nor would it make sense to read the work discussed in this essay only as Cold War literature because so doing runs the risk of reinscribing the very Cold War frame many writers found problematic. But analyzing “Korean War literature,” however disparate and difficult to compare the works themselves may otherwise be, allows us to see connections and continuities among wide swaths of work that do not at first seem to belong together.
The work of Korean War literature as a category helps explain, for example, the recent phenomenon of non–Korean American novelists who locate in the Korean War a turning point in US history when the promises of American democratic freedom went unfulfilled. These are writers aware of how Korea has been historically accounted for in terms of US political imperatives, but who are skeptical of this frame when writing from a non-Korean point of view. Thus in *Indignation* (2008), Philip Roth creates a plot in which American college student Marcus Messner ends up being killed in the Korean War. Although the war serves as a moment when global affairs can intrude on the lives even of promising young kids from New Jersey, there is little sense that it is being waged for any discernable political reason. Indeed, Roth announces his historical savvy by offering a version of the war consonant with second-phase writers who challenged the Cold War frame itself: the political basis for the war is not the specter of Communism, but rather petty bickering between Harry S. Truman and Douglas MacArthur (31–33). The novel’s poignant conclusion is that Messner’s death served no larger Cold War end: “In the struggle for the steep numbered hill on the spiny ridge in central Korea, both sides sustained casualties so massive as to render the battle a fanatical calamity, much like the war itself” (226). Likewise in Jayne Anne Phillips’s *Lark and Termite* (2009), a Faulkneresque exploration of a Southern family, large portions are set during the Korean War. Phillips in fact does Roth one better by focusing the Korean chapters on the No Gun Ri Massacre of July 1950, when US troops fired on South Korean refugees seeking shelter in a tunnel. Phillips’s world-weary Corporal Robert Leavitt, who dies trying to protect refugees in the tunnel, realizes that from the US perspective, the war is officially an extension of the Cold War: “It’s all one war despite players or location, war that sleeps dormant for years or months, then erupts and lifts its flaming head to find regimes changed, topography altered, weaponry recast” (6). As in much second-
phase fiction, this standard conception of Korean War as Cold War is dismantled throughout the novel as the action is set around a rogue action by the US military, and Leavitt is forced into intimate contact with the same sorts of Korean characters who are erased by a writer like Frank, and who are of central concern to writers like Kim, Park, Lee, and Choi. Phillips’s historical sensibility seems richer and more canny precisely because she rejects the Cold War rhetorical frame and instead focuses on an inexplicable moment of brutality which allows her to explore how the yoking of Korea to US political imperatives was reductive and indeed violent.

Roth’s and Phillips’s novels, while not primarily focused on the experience of Koreans or Korean Americans, are illuminated when read in light of the shift from first- to second-phase Korean War literature because they reject the notion that the Cold War frame adequately explains the situation in Korea, whatever the background of a given protagonist. Reading in such a context actually has profound consequences for the way we understand what American literature is or does in the post-1945, aggressively global age, for a certain version of “Cold War”—the one dominated by binaries, rhetorical warfare, and ideological abstraction—is a powerful way of conceptualizing how and why the United States found itself in a place like Korea. And yet, as I have argued, it is not finally a sufficient one, especially as the works themselves militate against this version of the Cold War. Korean War literature is no doubt informed—and in many ways dominated—by the Cold War frame, and yet is still crucially distinct from it. If we can locate in Korean War literature a rubric for understanding literary engagements with US global interventionism that acknowledges Cold War logic but does not reproduce it, then perhaps this is a model for other categories or frameworks that might help us understand the dynamic—rather than one-way—relationship between the US ideological project of Cold War and the localized experiences of particular places around the globe.
Notes

1 The phrase “scene of persuasion” is Donald Pease’s (1985).

2 For a discussion of Cold War literary and cultural studies that describes the shift from domestic concerns to global ones, see Belletto and Grausam (2012).


4 There has been increasing attention paid in literary and cultural studies to theorizing the global Cold War beyond positing two ideologically opposed, monolithic camps—a cultural logic that, as Nadel (1995) himself shows, breaks down by the mid-1960s. See Klein (2003) for an explanation of the integration model as a corollary to the containment narrative.

5 The most exhaustive history (in English) of the Korean War’s origins remains Cumings (1981, 1990). For a condensed account of his basic arguments, see Cumings (2011). See also Stueck (1995). For a discussion of the US political rhetoric surrounding the Korean War, see Casey (2008).

6 There are few studies of Korean War literature as such, but one book that ranges over many such works (but does not, tellingly, include any Korean American writers) is Axelsson (1990). For a collection of short stories and poetry about the Korean War, see Ehrhart and Jason (1999). See also Song (2008) and Seed (2004).

7 For an elaboration on the Cold War rhetorical frame, see Belletto (2012b, 3–34).


9 Cumings (1990, 349) puts the situation like this: “The Soviet-Korean relationship . . . seems in retrospect to have been more complex and troubled than usually thought; the proper image is not some sort of puppetry, but a wary duet between two distrustful associates.”

10 For one notable voice of dissent to this consensus view, see Stone (1952). Less well-known but no less incendiary is Stemons (1952).


12 See, for example, Carruthers (1998) and Jackson (2000). The most detailed analysis of the book and film is Jacobson and González (2006).
13 Although for illustrative purposes I am restricting my discussion of second-phase fiction mainly to Korean American writers, it would be fruitful to extend the analysis to writers of other backgrounds. See, in addition to Roth (2008) and Phillips (2009), Rolando Hinojosa’s *The Useless Servants* (1993), Ha Jin’s *War Trash* (2005) and Toni Morrison’s *Home* (2012).

14 For a discussion of how *The Martyred* conceptualizes the Korean War as a narrative battlefield, see Hong (2012).


16 For work on Cha and the Korean War, see Liu (2012) and Hyo Kim (2008).

17 For a discussion of the presence of the Korean War in *Native Speaker*, see Jodi Kim (2009).

References


