INTRODUCTION

In the following analysis of Japanese survey anthropology’s golden age in colonial Taiwan, I argue that the enterprise’s historical importance derives from its extra-scientific impact as a discursive intervention. Soon after the colony was annexed in 1895, Japan’s small contingent of Tokyo-based anthropologists began making their way south. Quite self-consciously, they sought to replace “pre-modern discourses” that accentuated the Other’s lack of civility with a cultural-pluralist framework that affirmed the Other’s intrinsic attributes. Within a decade, Japan’s survey anthropologists completed a serviceable ethnic map of Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples. Positioning themselves in sub-bureaucratic “centers of calculation”, their synoptic vision of a complex and previously inchoate local situation provided the ground for more refined surveys and detailed censuses as well as schema, images and terminologies that proliferated in Japanese propaganda, commercial writing and scholarly production.

However, survey anthropology’s academically informed model of human diversity did not enter Japanese colonial discourse uncontested. As it turned out, the cultural-pluralist framework was incommensurate with statist priorities of economy and speed, institutionalized under the leadership of de facto viceroy Gotō Shinpei (r.1898–1906). In fact, the ultimate centre of calculation in Taiwan was located in the Governor General’s office, not on the anthropologist’s desk. In the final analysis, I argue, the government anthropologist in Taiwan was an “intellectual middleman”, neither an author of policy nor a scholarly innovator. As intermediaries between field officers with day-to-day contact with Taiwan Aborigines and policy-makers who rarely ventured outside of Taipei, they formed the linchpin in a multi-tiered sifting mechanism that produced the centre’s working-knowledge of conditions in the highlands. In the end, their energetic and sophisticated discursive interventions could not prevent the northern tribes of central Taiwan from becoming typecast as unreconstructed savages who lacked the reason or cultural
capacity to respond to any policy but brute force.

BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS

Before fieldwork became the *sine qua non* of anthropological research, text-based scholars initiated cross-cultural comparison as a method of writing the universal history of human progress.⁷ Reflecting a non-conformist heritage of engagement with the abolitionist cause, champions of the method postulated the “psychic unity of man” as the ground for considering all peoples candidates for fruitful comparison. This “psychic unity” postulate pitted the comparativists against polygeneticists, who argued for the existence of distinct human races. As post-colonial critics have been quick to point out, however, the comparativists, by ranking peoples on a scale from savagery to civility, also contributed an intellectual justification for ideologies of difference and contempt for non-Europeans. According to the critical tradition, the evolutionists defeated the polygeneticists only to establish a more insidious paradigm for racism, substituting “culture” for “race” on the evolutionary scale, eventually succumbing to a pessimistic belief that cultural divides could not be bridged through the agencies of education and enlightenment.⁸

Like their intellectual forebears and actual teachers, survey anthropologists have left an ambiguous legacy, as champions of causes progressive for their time who also took part in a generalized apparatus of oppression. Survey anthropologists form a sort of historical “missing link” between armchair theoreticians and post-Malinowskian participant-observers. Admired for their stamina, ingenuity and encyclopaedic knowledge of world ethnology, they also find themselves excluded from the intellectual lineage of anthropology’s exemplary scholars. At the same time, like the comparativists, they remain interesting to historians as shapers and emblems of intellectual life in colonies, metropoles and the places in-between during the period of high imperialism. Unlike the armchair anthropologist, however, survey anthropologists physically confronted cultural variation in its environmental setting. They saw, heard, touched and smelled material and non-material artefacts *in situ*. Field experience, according to some, allowed survey anthropologists to conceptualize practices and objects as integrated ensembles, as components of particular cultures. In other words, their research methods lent themselves to a pluralist outlook. Their comparativist predecessors, in contrast, regarded implements and institutions as decontextualized data from which to distil a speculative history of the whole human race, instead of subdivisions thereof.

Because they ultimately relied upon the existence of a Latourian “center of calculation” to consolidate their findings, this essay considers survey anthropology as an extension and modification of the comparativist tradition, rather than as a precursor to participant-observation. Unlike their descendents, survey anthropologists never sought to view the world through the eyes of the peoples they studied; empathy was never the goal. Rather, survey anthropologists divided populations into intellectually and administratively digestible numbers of sub-units (tribes, races, ethnic groups) to answer questions or solve problems generated in
colonial metropoles. For our purposes, the colonial metropole, where “notes and queries” are authored, sent out from and ultimately collated, are equivalent to Latour’s “center of calculation”, the privileged place from which a totality of local situations can be viewed, abstracted and reduced to system.

Lastly, a word on the term “pluralism”. Nicholas Thomas argues that the modern pluralistic view of culture/ethnicity that informed and was elaborated by survey anthropology should be viewed as the successor of Christian and Enlightenment world-views that considered “heathens”, “infidels” and “primitives” as fundamentally incomplete human beings, either in need of salvation/education or expendable on the chopping block of history. Their negative traits — ignorance, illiteracy, etc. — defined the Other in the eyes of the observer. Building on the work of Johannes Fabian, Thomas argues that the discursive construction of tribes, races and ethnic groups as internally coherent collectivities which can be known, compared and ranked by recourse to study of “ideal types” ushered in the age of anthropological typification. His elegant formulation bears quotation in full:

What I seek to extrapolate from [Fabian] is an argument that in premodern European discourses, non-Western peoples tend to be characterized not in any anthropologically specific terms, but as a lack or poorer form of the values of the centre…My analytical fiction, then, tells of a shift from an absence of ‘the Other’ (as a being accorded any singular character) to a worldview that imagines a plurality of different races or peoples. The distinctively modern and anthropological imagining projects natural differences among people that may be rendered at one time as different ‘nations’, at another as distinct ‘races’ or ‘cultures’. The underlying epistemic operation — of partitioning the human species — makes possible a variety of political and ethnographic projects: particular populations may be visible as objects of government; they may serve as ethnological illustrations or subversive counter-examples in comparative social argument; and these reified characters may be available for appropriation in anticolonialist, nationalist narratives.9

This “distinctively modern and anthropological imagining” received much of its impetus, and exerted its influence, in the dialectical circulation of images, goods and people between colonial settings and metropolitan publics. Fortuitously, Thomas’s admittedly simplistic historical sketch, or “analytical fiction”, well describes the rupture in consciousness that Japanese survey ethnologists hoped to bring about in Taiwan. For this essay, the term “pluralism” is defined, following Thomas, as “a worldview that imagines a plurality of different races or peoples” in contradistinction to a worldview that conceptualizes different peoples “as a lack or poorer form of the values of the centre”.

PARTITIONING THE HUMAN SPECIES IN UPLAND TAIWAN

The Qing empire ceded Taiwan to Japan as part of the settlement to end the
Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95. As the Taiwan Government-General began setting up its capital in the face of armed resistance in June 1895, reports describing the curious folkways of the empire’s new subjects began to circulate in Japan. Especially prominent in the early wave of “first-encounter” documents were travel accounts of the hill tribes, collectively known as “banjin”, “seibanjin”, “yabanjin” or “banzoku”.

Even before the Government-General could safely inhabit its capital, Takigawa Miyotaro published “Our New Territory: The Island of Taiwan” to popularize the quasi-ethnographic information contained in Ueno Sen’ichi’s famous military intelligence report on conditions among the Aborigines. Ueno’s report was an amalgam of first-hand accounts and information collected by British lighthouse-keeper George Taylor. Well into the 1900s, the occupation inspired popular ethnography for Japanese consumption, in the form of newspaper, magazine and scholarly accounts of life in “Darkest Taiwan’s” interior.

For the small coterie of anthropologists attached to Tokyo University, the ethnological bounty of the new colony proved irresistible. The intellectual backgrounds and institutional affiliations of the major players, Inō Kanori, Torii Ryūzō and Mori Ushinosuke, have been well documented elsewhere. For our purposes, it is enough to say that Inō Kanori (1867–1925), our major protagonist, set sail for Taiwan on November 3, 1895. At the time, Inō supported himself as an editor of an education journal while contributing notes on folklore to the Journal of the Tokyo Anthropological Society and attending the lectures of Japanese anthropology’s founding father, Tsuboi Shōgorō. Inō embarked under the auspices of the Japanese Army, thereafter working in the documents section of the Government-General and as an administrator of the Japanese Language schools, pursuing his interest in Taiwan anthropology between assignments.

Inō’s most remarked-upon contribution to Taiwan anthropology was precisely the kind of “epistemic operation” described by Nicholas Thomas as quintessentially modern: an ethnic map cum taxonomy of the Taiwan Aborigines. Inō sought to replace the casual observations of his amateur co-nationals and the pre-modern Qing descriptions of Taiwan Aborigines with a scientifically ascertained taxonomy based on the investigation of racial-cultural diversity in upland Taiwan. Inō Kanori succinctly stated these goals in mid-1895:

The people of Taiwan are known by three types: Chinese (shinajin), cooked barbarians (jukuban), and raw barbarians (seiban). As for the Chinese, of course their descendents will become obedient citizens (kika no min) — it should not present much difficulty to govern them. However, the raw and cooked barbarians need to be investigated from the perspectives of natural as well as conjectural science (keijikajō). Thereafter, an administration and an educational policy can be structured. As for “cooked” and “raw”, these are general terms formerly used to reflect degrees of submission to [Qing] government. If we look at it from a scientific point of view, however, there are at least four or five different tribes/races (shuzoku) [of Aborigines], as we know from
looking at the articles written by foreigners who have investigated this area. But what about the intrinsic, distinctive (koyū) physiologies, psychology and local customs of the various tribes? What about their connections to the Philippine islands and neighboring islanders? To this day, these are unsettled issues. Today, by the hands of our countrymen, the clarification of these questions will, it goes without saying, contribute to our political goals...And we shall also see results in regard to our scholarly aspirations.¹⁶

Inō’s manifesto (and subsequent writings) called for Japanese survey anthropologists to identify the unique features of each shuzoku (tribe/ethnos) on Taiwan in order to better understand the differences among the groups subsumed under the Qing terms shengfan (raw barbarian) and shufan (cooked barbarian). Inō also emphasized that anthropology should render faithful service to the state as a form of intelligence gathering. These two goals would come into conflict, I will argue, undermining Inō’s ability to construct a coherent account of Japanese relations with the uplanders, in effect forcing him to choose between loyalty to an emerging discipline or obedience to his bureaucratic superiors.

On May 26, 1897, Inō formed an expedition party to begin a 192-day ethnographic survey tour by order of the colony’s Bureau of Education. The Government-General ordered Inō and his partner, Awano Dennojō, to devise a portrait of Aboriginal society for the purpose of making recommendations on the subject of Aboriginal schooling. The results were sent to Gotō Shinpei in early 1899 as a report titled Taiwan Banjin jijō (Conditions among the Taiwan Aborigines).¹⁷ Considered Inō’s magnum opus, Banjin jijō is a rich, descriptive and internally conflicted document that speaks in multiple voices, reflecting Inō’s intermediary position in the colonial order of things. Relying on his own observations in the field (though never in any one spot for long), archival research in Chinese records and interviews with Pacification-Reclamation officers,¹⁸ Inō constructed a matrix of defining traits — physical features, everyday usages and implements (dozoku), cultural practices (kanshū), language and oral traditions — to classify the inhabitants of Taiwan’s interior into eight discrete ethnic groups.

The Janus-faced nature of this document, a testament to survey anthropology’s ambiguous legacy, is illustrated by Inō’s characterization of the Atayal peoples. On the penultimate page of his 283-page report, Inō warned Japanese officials against the temptation to caricature the Aborigines (banzoku) as savage headhunters.¹⁹ In Inō’s taxonomic grid, “headhunting” comprised a single item out of six elements called “customs”, while “customs” themselves stood beside other bundles of defining traits, such as “physical features”, “language”, “technology” and others. Inō emphasized that many Aboriginal groups had ceased headhunting, but even those who continued, like the Atayal, were also competent agriculturists and weavers. Moreover, continued Inō, the savage custom of headhunting was perpetuated as a form of defence against aggressive Han settlers. Inō finished by asserting that the tribes of Australia and Africa were much more primitive than
Taiwan’s headhunting Atayal, thereby relativizing their backwardness by recourse to the accumulating world-wide database of “cultures” put into play by the armchair comparativists of yore.\textsuperscript{20}

Going completely against the grain of his conclusion, Inō began the substantive sections of \textit{Banjin jijō} by fixing the Atayal peoples as Taiwan’s least-advanced tribe, describing them as preternaturally xenophobic, bloodthirsty headhunters responsible for over a hundred beheadings annually.\textsuperscript{21} Inō’s evolutionary ranking of the tribes, in what we might today call the “bullet-points of the report”, attributed the Atayal’s bottom position to environmental factors:

Taiwan’s most advanced Aborigines are the Peipo tribe (ping-puzu), followed by the Parizarizao section of the Paiwan tribe, the Puyuma tribe, the Amis tribe and others who inhabit the plains. The lowest position is occupied by the Atayal tribe, who all live deep in the valleys, whose steep mountain paths have obstructed intercourse and made travel difficult...There is no doubt that this state of affairs is directly related to the degree of intercourse with the Chinese. Especially in those villages located among Chinese settlements, we see the most pronounced progress (shinpo).\textsuperscript{22}

Thus, Inō’s evolutionary perspective reproduced elements of the old Qing “Sino-centric World Order” ethos that equated “civilization” with proximity to China’s sacral-political centre. Emma Teng, in her analysis of Qing nomenclature, discourse and travel writing vis-à-vis the Taiwan Aborigines, identifies a persistent strain in Qing documents which demonizes the Aborigines for their lack of civility. She terms such discourse the “rhetoric of privation”, in contrast to the more romanticized rhetoric of primitivism (the “Noble Savage”).\textsuperscript{23} Though Inō equated distance from Chinese influence with savagery in much of his ethology, he severely criticized the rhetoric of privation as non-scientific in another venue, writing:

When the Chinese first learned of Taiwan’s location, they acknowledged the existence of the island’s own people, or “the natives”. There are many writings that attest to this. But at the time, they only recognized the natives as a different people, with different language and customs, but did not give them a particular name...In Ming times, the name “Eastern Barbarians” (dongfan) was used, probably meaning “the barbarians of the Eastern Seas...After the Qing occupied Taiwan, there were two major divisions, based on the presence or absence of political compliance [to the Qing], the seiban and the jukuban...They did not, [however,] make observations about race.\textsuperscript{24}

In this passage, the term “political compliance” is loaded. From the Sino-centric World Order perspective, the court of the Chinese emperor is the metonymous centre/apex of tradition, refinement, power and learning. The source of humanity-making benevolence is configured as a geographical node of virtue, which radiates outward and downward via the power of attraction, imitation and what we might today call acculturation. The boundaries
of the realm of civilization are extended by bureaucracy, the repository of Confucian learning and instrument of Chinese statecraft. Thus, in the passage above “the absence or presence of political compliance” also denotes “cultural” submission to the Chinese centre. Thus, Inō’s critique prefigures Thomas’s characterization of pre-modern discourses about the Other; they are distinguished from modern scientific discourses by their fixation on lack or presence, their overbearing concern with the “values of the centre”.

There are, then, two major contradictions in Inō’s ethnology of Taiwan Aborigines. First, the relativizing rhetoric of the *Taiwan Banjin jijō*’s conclusion contradicts the rhetoric of privation that permeates the body of the report; and Inō’s explicitly modern-pluralist approach to taxonomy is undermined by his ultimate recourse to the Sinocentric preoccupation with the Atayals’ physical and cultural distance from the Middle Kingdom. These glaring contradictions call for explanation, because Inō was, if anything, a deliberate scholar, a man obsessed with establishing himself as a member of the Meiji-period bureaucratic-literary elite.

As an ethnologist in 1899 colonial Taiwan, Inō was writing against a discourse that put the human status of the Atayal into question. Anthropologist David Scott uses the term *vindicationalism* for such narratives. In other words, if the question is: “Are the Atayal beasts or human beings?” then Inō’s reply, in the vindicationist mode, is “They are human beings.” Inō’s contemporary Torii Ryūzō, fellow survey anthropologist and veteran of Tsunbo Shōgorō’s seminars, also laced his ethnological notes with vindicationist rhetoric. Moreover, Torii’s interpreter, Mori Ushinosuke, who would himself become a prominent government expert on Aboriginal languages, was an adamant vindicationist as well. Thus, it would be fair to characterize Taiwan survey anthropology of the Meiji period (1895–1912) more generally as a vindicationist enterprise.

*Banjin jijō* was, however, only partly an ethnological study. Primarily, it was edited and abbreviated for practical application as a report submitted to Gotō Shinpei, Taiwan’s Minister of Civil Affairs from 1898 to 1906. Analyzing the interplay between Gotō the powerful administrative superior and Inō the dutiful bureaucrat is as important as it is difficult. As a self-styled visionary and actor on the global stage, Gotō, an accomplished physician and public-health administrator, frequently invoked the scientific method as a rationale for his policy proclamations. Gotō’s avowed appetite for research on colonized populations, is matched by Inō Kanori’s reputation as a producer of such knowledge. Inō, the indefatigable, driven and scrupulous editor, compiler, analyst and fieldworker, is commonly regarded as the father of modern Taiwan Studies, and was certainly the government’s acknowledged expert on Aboriginal country around 1900. In addition, both men hailed from the area of northeastern Japan’s Iwate prefecture, giving them common cause as rising men from Japan’s rural periphery. Considering these factors, one would expect Inō’s ethnological labours to have had a large impact on Gotō’s view of Aborigines in Taiwan. Paradoxically, it appears that Gotō influenced Inō’s thinking instead; though Gotō of course had very little specific knowledge about the
Aborigines themselves, and was ostensibly being informed by Inō’s work.

E. Patricia Tsurumi has aptly characterized Gotō’s rough-and-ready sociology of Taiwan as garden-variety Spencerian evolutionism. Tsurumi’s judgement finds evidence in a much-reproduced 1901 policy statement entitled “An Opinion on the Necessity of Conducting a Survey into Customary Law for the Governance of Taiwan”. Here, Gotō applied Spencerian logic to assert that Taiwan’s Chinese population was not ready for the sudden introduction of fully civilized Japanese legal codes, because it had become accustomed to a partially civilized legal regime during 200 years of Qing rule. In other words, the rights guaranteed to Japanese subjects under the 1889 constitution would not be granted to Taiwanese (though, of course, the obligations would) for fear that too-sudden a change would shock the “organism” of Taiwanese society. And as for the Aborigines, Gotō used the general marker for savagery, yaban, to degrade them and assert that they also could not be governed through modern law codes. Gotō referred to the “savages who dwell in the undeveloped lands” as living fossils from antiquity in a classic example of what Johannes Fabian has called “allochronic” discourse.

On one important point only, it appears that Gotō incorporated Inō’s ethnology into his own thinking. His declaration that the Aborigines and the Chinese were distinct populations was of a piece with Inō’s 1895 manifesto quoted above. We shall return to the significance of this agreement below. On the whole, however, it appears that Gotō was more hostile to than ignorant of Inō’s report of 1899. In what must have come as a stinging rebuke to Inō Kanori, Gotō applauded the efforts of government employees (like Inō?) to submit their hard-earned local knowledge to the government in the form of reports. Gotō rejected, however, the existing knowledge at hand as too unsystematic and non-specialist. Gotō wrote that Western nations had sufficiently developed scholarly communities to let specialists compete among themselves to study native customs, laws and economy; in these advanced nations, the government only had to convene these scholars and reap the harvest. For Gotō, Japan’s civil society (kokumin/“national people”) was still too immature for its government to take such a laissez-faire approach.

Matsuda Kyōko argues that Inō’s recourse to Social Darwinism stemmed from his visceral reaction to harsh research conditions. Poor infrastructure, lack of security and forbidding terrain combined to provoke Inō to project his “struggle to conduct a survey” onto the Atayal peoples as a “struggle for survival”. In short, Inō reasoned that the Atayal had been pushed to such extreme living conditions because they had been forced into the interior by superior forces (the Chinese). This analysis is attractive, for it shows the survey anthropologist responding to the local environment, yet in such a way that his own relationship to the culture-bearer is reified into an enduring characteristic of that society, exposing both the strengths and weaknesses of the genre. At the same time, Matsuda’s analysis does not explain the grave contradiction between Inō’s vindicationism and his rhetoric of privation.

My alternative explanation is admittedly speculative, but has the advantage
of clarifying the contradictions within Inō’s corpus. I believe that Inō adopted elements of the rhetoric of privation and the language of Social Darwinism in the Banjin jijō to anticipate or answer to Gotō’s objections to his vindicationism. Inō began and finished his field survey before Gotō came to Taiwan, concluding on December 1, 1897. During a 13-month interval, Inō collated his data, read more deeply in Qing documents and drew his conclusions. He filed his report to Gotō on January 9, 1899, about eight months into Gotō’s tenure. During his write-up period, he was fired as part of Gotō’s and Governor-General Kodama Gentarō’s administrative house-cleaning of March 1898, only to be re-hired soon after. He then quit again in December 1898 to return to Tokyo for a year. Considering that Gotō’s fondness for evolutionary metaphors was well-known to Inō during a period of intermittent unemployment, it seems not unreasonable to expect that Inō would recast his survey ethnology to meet the expectations of powerful and sceptical readers. If Inō often portrayed himself as the centre of calculation vis-à-vis colonial policemen, military officers and amateur ethnographers, he in turn answered to an even more paramount centre of calculation in the person of Gotō Shinpei.

As we have seen, Gotō Shinpei did not think Inō’s survey worthy of the name “science” in 1901. Nonetheless, he sufficiently appreciated Inō’s skills as an editor and compliant underling to commission him for several more projects, making Inō, in effect, the Government-General’s in-house historian of indigenous Administration, for both the Qing and Japanese periods. In this new role, Inō would begin a second career in Taiwan as an historian, shifting his purview from the mapping of cultures in space to the identification of meaningful segments of linear time.

A BROKEN NARRATIVE: INŌ KANORI’S “10-YEAR HISTORY”

Like the 1900 Taiwan Banjin jijō, Inō Kanori’s 1905 Ryō Tai jūnen shi (10-Year History of the Occupation of Taiwan) was compiled for the Government-General’s second-in-command, Gotō Shinpei. Gotō’s preface stressed that the history of Taiwan was testament to Japan’s achievements as a modern colonial power. Inō of course inscribed Gotō’s progressive view of history into this historical digest, though he stumbled in his short chapter on indigenous Administration, the topic he knew best. As a government scribe, Inō imposed a linear, progressive narrative structure upon the confused history of Japanese-indigenous relations by making Japan’s “punitive policy” into the dynamic element of the narrative. Inō thereby de-emphasized the record of conflict within the administration and the complex story of frontier diplomacy in the earlier period. This simplification, in turn, erased the pluralistic view of Taiwan’s internally differentiated Aboriginal population from the official narrative, while maintaining the major distinction between Chinese and Austronesian races.

In its chapter on indigenous Administration, the “10-Year History” ignores the first eight months of martial law on Taiwan (August 1895–March 1896) to open with the Government-General’s declaration of civilian rule on April 1, 1896. This opening gambit is important, for it establishes the Confucian subtext of Inō’s preferred and intended narrative structure:
civil government is normal, ideal and laudable, while martial law is a last resort, an expedient for failed policies. Again we can detect Gotō’s hidden hand here, recalling that the Minister of Civil Affairs insisted, upon taking the portfolio in 1898, that he be paramount to all military men in Taiwan, except for the Governor-General, Kodama Gentarō. To dramatize his much-publicized belief that military rule was ruining the colony, Gotō actually struck a naval officer in front of a military audience to defend his own honour. Kodama, ever Gotō’s protector, approved of Gotō’s brash action.

The first event of Inō’s history, then, is the establishment of the Pacification-Reclamation Office (bukonsho). The Bukonsho, wrote Inō, was chartered “solely to enact ‘moral suasion’ (kyōka) among the Aborigines”. Inō then added, contradictorily as it turned out, that the Bukonsho was also charged with overseeing the “economic development” (kaihatsu) of the “Aboriginal territory” and “finding useful employments for the Aborigines (banjin no jusan)”. The tension between kyōka and kaihatsu becomes clear if we comprehend “moral suasion” as a spatial metaphor rooted in the “Sinocentric” topographical political imagination, and conceive of kaihatsu as a temporal metaphor more appropriate to Enlightenment theories of progress. In the former model, the centre of calculation is the Imperial Centre itself, eternal, patient and inevitably triumphant. In the latter model, the centre of calculation is the state’s political leadership, which resolves conflicts and defines efficiency in the context of national interest in a world of competing nation-states.

Perhaps anticipating Gotō’s views on the subject, Inō posited headhunting as the defining trait for “certain tribes in the northern half of the island” to introduce the Aborigines in his “Ten-Year history”. This stereotype, based on a single trait of the population in question, was precisely the kind of demonizing Inō decried in his vindicationist mode five years earlier. Adding force to the “trope of the savage headhunter”, Inō used the contrasting term ryōmin to describe their victims. In Qing-period usage, ryōmin (Chinese: liang-min) referred to tax-paying artisans, merchants and agriculturists: literally, the “good people”. Inō attributed ryōmin victimhood to the atavistic Aboriginal “custom” of headhunting, initially constructing a culturalist explanation redolent with the rhetoric of privation. In the discursive field of “moral suasion” (kyōka), then, such “evil customs” would ideally be reformed by the civilizing, edifying influences of the centre, as transmitted by civil (Chinese: wen, Japanese: bun) institutions like the Bukonsho.

In the first turning-point in his narrative, Inō recounted that the Bukonsho could not stop Aboriginal attacks on ryōmin through moral suasion alone. Therefore, the Government-General formulated a system of punishments (chōbatsu) directed at Aboriginal headhunters in late 1897. Despite this concession to expedience (force), Inō assured readers that Japanese policy remained organized on the principle of “reassurance through acts of kindness (suibu)”, to argue that the “civil” impulse was still ascendant around 1898.

Quite abruptly, Inō then changes tack to describe headhunting incidents as “acts of murder and assault” (kyōkō) to explain
the government’s expansion of police forces (keisatsu) along the Aboriginal border in 1898. The new intolerance of “assault and murder” can be read as headhunting’s redefinition from “custom” to “crime”. This reconsideration was warranted, according to Inō, by a “fear that headhunting would stop plans for Aboriginal-territory development dead in their tracks”. Curiously, Inō neglects to mention any specific commodities or economic activities that might have been connected to headhunting at the time (though he surely knew, as we shall see below).

As violence became unmanageable on the Aboriginal frontier in 1898, the Government-General lacked a unified plan. The argument over whether to consider headhunting as a custom in need of reform or as crime in need of punishment fomented a “clash of opinions” within the bureaucracy. Still maintaining the Confucian perspective, Inō called the “moral suasion” emphasis of Bukonsho civil administration the “positive policy” and referred to “punishments” as the “negative policy”.

Then, in what Inō called a “Great Revolution”, in June 1898 the Government-General dissolved the Bukonsho, for allegedly leaning too far in the direction of leniency/atraction to the neglect of force/punishment. Henceforth, Aboriginal Affairs was put under the rubric “severity tempered with leniency” (on’i narabi okonawaru), a dignified location for “carrot and stick”. Subsequent narratives characterized the dissolution of the Bukonsho as a necessary response to Aboriginal savagery. Inō, however, intimated that perhaps it might have been made effective if given more time. Such a hypothesis would explain why Inō switched back to the vindicationist mode in this narrative, now casting the northern Aborigines as history’s victims. Halfway through Inō’s account, the Han are transformed from “ryōmin” (good people) into “Chinamen”. Temporarily abandoning the rhetoric of privation that explained headhunting in terms of “savagery”, Inō implied that both Han and Aborigines were to blame for the mayhem that was impeding Japanese development in the highlands. Recalling an early staple of Japanese official rhetoric before the Kodama-Gotō era, Inō now claimed that Taiwan’s Chinese settlers provoked Aboriginal bloodlust by taking advantage of their ignorance and stupidity (gumō) to perpetrate land swindles.

Ostensibly acting as an impartial broker to stop the revenge cycle, the Government-General decreed that all non-Aborigines (Chinese) obtain permits to reside in “ Aboriginal territory” in February 1900. At this point in the narrative, Inō’s confusion and discomfort become palpable. Even after situating Aboriginal-initiated violence within a context of Han perfidy, Inō back-tracked to describe Aboriginal “assault and murder” as irrational behaviour. In a tortured locution that I read as a concession to the preferences of the administrators above him, Inō wrote: “As the number of people entering the Aboriginal districts increased, the ignorant Aborigines harboured suspicions of invasion, prompting the Aborigines to perpetrate outrages on an immeasurable/disproportionate scale.”

Accordingly, from 1902 onward, heavily armed and staffed guardlines (Japanese: aiyū; Chinese: aiyong) were exten-
ded to physically separate Aboriginal territory from the rest of Taiwan. In January 1903, all of northern Aboriginal country was placed under police jurisdiction, in a complete concession to the “expedient” of police rule. Bringing his narrative up to the present (1905), Inō wrote that the Aboriginal population north of Puli in Nantou prefecture was now governed solely under the rubric of “force and intimidation” (iatsu kyōsei), while the southern Aborigines would be governed under the banner of “education and largesse” (keihatsu suibu). In this perplexing document, Inō has the northern Aborigines commit atrocities because they are provoked by cunning Chinese invaders who take advantage of their ignorance. And yet the Japanese government responds by ruling these historical victims under the rubric of “force and intimidation”. At the same time, readers are to believe that by 1905 the “southern Aborigines” were willing objects of non-coercive policies of tutelage and guidance. Inō concluded this report with an unconvincing assurance that the Government-General’s two-pronged approach would likely produce good results sometime in the future.

For students of the Taiwan Banjin jijō, as well as for Japanese administrators at the time, there could be little doubt that the choice of Puli, Nantou prefecture, as a dividing line in Inō’s narrative meant that Inō was defining the “northern tribes” as the Atayal. In Inō’s taxonomy of 1899, all tribes south of Puli, which is the geographic centre of Taiwan, do not practise the art of facial tattooing (although limb tattoos were found throughout the island). Other than this single distinguishing feature, there was no ethnologic basis for bifurcating Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples into southern and northern halves. This division was, instead, political. While Inō’s survey anthropology of the late 1890s demonstrated internal diversity and a welter of varied political conditions in rural Taiwan, his narratology, like the old Qing paradigm he once tried to overturn, employed a typology that sorted Aborigines into “good” (southern) and “bad” (northern) imperial subjects. Inō did not invent this Manichean nomenclature; he merely reappropriated it from the “amateurs” he once ridiculed as unfit to perform ethnological analysis.

From as early as 1896, Japanese officials, notably Nagano Yoshitora, found that Bunun warriors in the environs of Puli could be persuaded to bear arms for the government in its skirmishes against villages north of Puli, who fell under the broad rubric “Atayal”. From this time forward, the “southern tribes” became symbols of compliance in official documents, while the Atayal became stock villains in Japanese rhetoric. It is important to note here that Bunun were also known as headhunters and, in fact, could be induced to take heads at the behest of the Japanese state. We can thus conclude that Inō’s 1905 narrative located savagery not in the act of murder, but in the act of non-compliance with government demands.

According to several contemporary sources, the Atayal tribes clustered around Wushe (“Musha” to the Japanese) made themselves odious to the Japanese when a few villagers murdered 14 Japanese road surveyors in February 1897, the ill-fated Fukahori expedition. The long saga of investigation, recovery of remains, and economic blockades to punish those responsible is indeed a central thread in the area’s
history under Japanese colonial rule. Probably more important, though, is the fact that many of the settlements just north of Puli abutted rich stands of camphor. Several “northern tribes” were active in the lumbering trade, charging outsiders like the Japanese fees for access to the forests in the early years of colonial rule. Disputes with a particularly powerful Saisyatt entrepreneur-chief named Ri Agui erupted into a large-scale war in late 1902. Like the Atayal, the Japanese subsumed the Saisyatt under the term “northern tribes” in later discourse, again suggesting that “northern tribes” was really shorthand for “non-compliant” villages. Mochiji Rokusaburō is considered by many to have been the brains behind Gotō’s Aboriginal policy. In his famous position paper of late 1902, he proposed that the Aboriginal Territory be divided into northern and southern sectors, with the former earmarked for military conquest, the southern for “moral suasion”. And thus, the rough-and-ready demarcation of operational zones in the war to increase the empire’s wealth obliterated fine distinctions made by survey anthropologists like Inō Kanori, who wrote in 1899 that “the disparities in cultural attainment within tribal divisions is often just as varied as the disparities between tribes themselves”.

The image of the north/south division among Aborigines was cemented in a rather grisly affair on October 5, 1903. Then, Japanese officials induced their Bunun allies from Kantaban to entrap, ambush and slaughter more than 100 Atayal men (from Palaan and Hogo) in a single morning near Puli. These so-called southern tribesmen actually redeemed the heads at a Japanese outpost, and were photographed doing so. Thus, by 1903, Japanese administrators began to define all Aborigines north of Puli, who were distinctive because of their facial tattoos, as a problem population as a result of economic disputes over rights to camphor stands and local resistance to Japanese attempts to survey remote areas. The empirical poverty of this conceptual apparatus is laid bare when we observe that Japanese army and police forces fought a number of pitched battles with villages of “southern tribesmen” (Paiwan and Bunun especially) well into the 1930s.

**BIOPower and NecroPower in Colonial Taiwan**

Public intellectual, journalist and parliamentarian Takekoshi Yosaburō visited Taiwan in 1904 to write a book celebrating Japan’s colonial achievements. A committed Whig historian, Takekoshi was the embodiment of progressive thought in Meiji Japan. In his largely hagiographic portrait of Gotō’s reforming administration, Takekoshi cited Inō Kanori as his authority on conditions in Aboriginal country, while praising Gotō Shinpei’s broader vision for developing the island. Takekoshi’s ambivalent report on indigenous administration, I believe, is evidence that Inō was still articulating a vindicationist rhetoric in his face-to-face dealings with other Japanese, even if his ethnological and historical writing under the auspices of the Government-General deployed the “trope of the savage headhunter” as an explanatory device. Takekoshi’s view of the situation as it existed around 1904 is more candid and less reticent than Inō’s 1905 digest as to why the “northern tribes” had been singled out.
for the policy of “intimidate and coerce” after 1903:

Almost everybody who has come in contact with the savages declares that they are all quite capable of being raised from their present state of barbarism…But it is a question how much longer the Japanese authorities will be willing to pursue their present policy of moderation and goodwill, and leave nearly half the island in their hands. If there were a prospect of their becoming more manageable in ten or even in twenty years, the present policy might possibly be continued for that length of time, but if the process should require a century or so, it is quite out of the question, as we have not that length of time spare. This does not mean that we have no sympathy at all for the savages. It simply means that we have to think more about our 45,000,000 sons and daughters than about the 104,000 savages [emphasis added].

In Takekoshi’s analysis, “the policy of moderation and goodwill” is none other than the Bukonsho ideal of kyōka, or “moral suasion”. The Bukonsho’s charter stated that officers should learn Aboriginal languages, study their customs and enact the policy of kyōka in accordance with this hard-earned knowledge. In fact, the wording of the Bukonsho’s charter (March 1896) resembles Goto’s 1901 rationale for a survey of customary law: good policy is based on accurate knowledge of local conditions. But as the Bukonsho project was launched, the enormity of the task as outlined became apparent. The variety and difficulty of local languages, the complexity of the “late imperial frontier economy” in the borderlands, and the resistance of armed Taiwanese all revealed that the enactment of “moral suasion” would be a long-term approach. Japanese officials, with few exceptions, did not understand Aboriginal languages, and even lacked accurate information about the location of many northern villages. To learn these languages, and map this terrain, local alliances would be required, and these were always slow in the forging.

For officials in Taipei, however, the rhythms of compound interest on public bonds, Japanese election cycles and the challenges of international diplomacy set the timetable for action. Despite protestations that severity was required as a response to “headhunting”, it is clear that the “metropolitan clock” indeed ticked loudly in Goto’s ears as the Japanese public grew weary of colonial debts to the mother country and stories of rampant corruption in the management of the island. To solve the fiscal problems of empire, Goto instituted a camphor monopoly in 1899, and it began to pay quite handsomely by 1901. As the Government-General became addicted to this new income stream, policy indeed tipped away from the kyōka faction and towards the chōbatsu faction. As Antonio C. Tavares has demonstrated, harvesting and processing of camphor under the old system of traditional fees to indigenous strongmen was too slow and complicated to accommodate the high-velocity commodity flows that were now required to balance the colonial books. Thus, the Government-General began to support, rather than restrain, Japanese camphor companies who flouted
local conventions and thereby exacerbated frontier skirmishing over access to resources.  

Takekoshi’s blunt statement of an “us or them” mentality indicates a way out of a key dilemma posed by Japanese survey anthropology under the Gotô regime. That is, it clarifies how Gotô and his chosen coterie could at once be the very emblems of Foucauldian “governmentality” in their zeal for colonial research, infrastructure programmes and public health policy while, at the same time, remaining ignorant and even hostile to survey anthropology, even if done in the name of the state. Yao Jen-to argues that post-colonial critics are off the track when they study literature and fiction to understand colonialist discourse as a series of misreadings, errors and silences. Instead, Yao insists, the statistical-bureaucratic-legal machine that was the Taiwan Government-General is better understood in terms of what it did know about the population it constituted through its statistical compendia, surveys and development projects. In this analysis, the Taiwan Government-General was the quintessential biopolitical regime, because it “forced the Taiwanese to become healthy”; not for humanitarian reasons, but to grow a large labour force of “docile bodies” as the engine of a colonial economy.

Interestingly, Yao considers the 1905 census of Taiwan to have been a precociously detailed and fine-grained example of surveillance, an example of how far the Japanese state reached into the lives of the populace. However, Yao fails to mention that 60% of Taiwan’s territory, the abode of the Aborigines, was excluded from the census because of its sparse population, poor infrastructure and unsettled political conditions. How can we consider a regime as the essence of “biopower” and “governmentality” when it avoids surveying 60% of its territory? The answer lies in Takekoshi Yosaburô’s summary remarks on indigenous administration around 1904. If the “biopolitical” body, the population whose increase and health the government seeks to further, is construed as the whole empire, the home islands of Japan (naichi) and all of Taiwan, then the government’s willingness to confine, embargo and slaughter Atayal villagers is logical within a governmental framework. That is to say, from Takekoshi’s perspective, the northern tribes were jeopardizing the increase, wealth and survival of Japan’s “45 millions”.

From Inô’s, Torii’s and Mori’s centre of calculation, Aboriginal territory loomed large; it was a treasure-house of ethnic abundance and a forbidding terrain that might require decades to survey properly. For the survey anthropologist, space was everything. For Gotô and Takekoshi, however, population was more important than space; from their centre of calculation in Tokyo, biopolitical considerations doomed the ethnologist’s vindicationist rhetoric to the dustbin of history. And yet, as Kobayashi Gakuji has perceptively argued, Inô’s taxonomic work was not a completely innocent exercise. In Kobayashi’s analysis, it was Inô and the survey anthropologists, with their modern theories of race and ethnicity, who drew the sharp conceptual line between “Chinese” and “Aborigine” in Taiwan. This epistemic operation, to use Nicholas Thomas's language, indeed “partitioned the human species” in such a way as to enable the Japanese officials analysed above to treat
camphor-related violence as a distinct category of trouble; namely, the “Aboriginal Problem”.

ENDNOTES


2 “Taiwan Aborigines” is a translation of the Chinese word Yuanzhumin, or Japanese Genjûmin. Others translate it as “Formosan Aborigines”. The proper noun Yuanzhumin was adopted as the official designation of Taiwan’s indigenous population in the third revision of the Taiwan constitution (1994), in response to organized efforts by indigenous rights groups. The proper noun “Taiwan Aborigines” will be used interchangeably with “Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan” throughout this essay.

3 This phrase was coined by Bruno Latour, Science In Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); in this essay, I am following Matthew G. Hannah, who applied the concept to population inventories in Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.131–41.


6 This phrase taken from Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p.40, who described George Kennan as “someone with an interest in ideas and with a knack for conveying them to a less scholarly audience”.


8 George W. Stocking Jr., “The Dark-Skinned Savage: The Image of Primitive Man in Evolutionary Anthropology” in Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology (New York: The
Contending Centres of Calculation in Colonial Taiwan


10 These terms have extremely pejorative connotations and have been replaced in official and popular discourse with the general term “Yuanzhùmin/Genjùmin”, which I will translate as “Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan” or “Taiwan Aborigines”.


13 Inō Kanori and Awano Dennyū, *Taiwan Banjin jijō* (Conditions among Taiwan’s Aborigines) (Taipei: Ministry of Civil Affairs, Records Division, 1900).

14 For examples, see Hashiguchi Bunzō, “Taiwan jōjō (Conditions on Taiwan)”, *Tokyo chigakuk kyōkai hōkokus*, 13, 11 (February 1892), 21–48; Sanbō honbu, ed., *Taiwan shi* (Taiwan Gazette) (Tokyo: January 1895).

15 For example, see Hashiguchi Bunzō, “Taiwan jōjō (Conditions on Taiwan)”, *Tokyo chigakuk kyōkai hōkokus*, (Journal of the Tokyo Geographic Society) 17, 3 (1895): 313–8; *Taiwan Asahi Shinn bun* 9/29/1895; Iriye Takeshi and Hashimoto Shigeru, “Taiwan banchi zatsuzoku”, *Fuzoku gahō* 130 (1896): 29–30.


19 Robert Tierney has argued that “at the height of aboriginal resistance to Japanese subjugation campaigns, the aborigines came to be defined by the single custom of headhunting”, precisely the type of crude stereotyping Inō, at least in his pluralist voice, was trying to work against: Tierney, “Going Native”, p. 36.

20 A classic example is Edward B. Tylor, “On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions; Applied to Laws of Marriage and Descent”, *The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 18 (1889): 246, in which Tylor is able to draw on “roughly 350 peoples”, “ranging from insignificant savage hordes to great cultured nations” to conduct his analysis.

21 Inō, *Taiwan Banjin jijō*, p. 3.

22 Ibid, p. 112.


24 Inō Kanori, “Shinajin no Taiwan doban ni kansuru jinshu teki kansatsu”, *Taiwan kanshū kijii* 5, 8 (August 1905): 52.


26 All translations of Japanese sources are by the author. Inō Kanori, “Yo no sekishi o nobete sendatsu no kunshi ni uttari” (I Declare My Sincere Intentions to the Honorable Gentlemen who Have Gone Before), originally published in the November 3, 1895 issue of the Kōyūku hōshi and the December 5, 1895 issue of the *Iwate gakujii* hō, according to Ogino Kaoru, ed., Inō Kanori: *Nenpu, shiryō, shoshi* (Inō Kanori: Chronology, Materials, and Writing) (Tōno, Iwate: Tōno Monogatari kenkyūjo, 1998), p. 158; 224; the document itself is reproduced on pp. 115–7 of this volume. Moriguchi, also an Iwate-ken scholar who has worked with Inō’s papers, thinks the paper was written not too long after the Treaty of Shimono-seki (4/17/1895); the text is also reproduced in: Moriguchi Kazunari, ed., *Inō Kanori no Taiwan ōsa nikki* (Inō Kanori’s Taiwan Expedition Journals) (Taipei: Taiwan fūbutsu zasshisha, 1992), p. 306; Inō himself reproduced this document as the preface to his pioneering political history of Taiwan: Inō Kanori, “Shein” (Preface) *Taiwan Shi* (Taiwan Chronicle) vol. 1 (Tokyo: Bungakusha, 1902), pp. 1–5.
28 Inō’s voluminous correspondence has been preserved in the Tōno, Iwate-ken municipal library; letters from famous men like Tsuboi and Yanagita Kunio are prominently displayed in several memorial albums of Inō exhibits; a search of the registers in Tōno and my study of these albums has turned up not one single surviving letter from Gotō Shinpei, a curious circumstance indeed.
30 Gotō Shinpei, “Taiwan keiejō kyūkan seido no chōsa o hitsuyō to suru iken”, (Tokyo: Tōa kenkyūjo dai roku chōsa iinkai, 1930) [Reproduced from Tokyo Nichinichi shinbun nos.8771–3, 1901] p.27.
31 Ibid, p.13; Fabian, Time and the Other.
33 Matsuda, “Ryōtai shoki”.
34 Moriguchi Kazunari, ed., Inō Kanori no Taiwan Tōsa Nikki (Inō Kanori’s Taiwan Expedition Journals) (Taipei: Taiwan fūbutsu zasshisha, 1992), pp.138, 360–61; Inō, Taiwan Banjin jijō, preface, p.3.
35 Barclay, “Japanese and American Colonial Projects”.
36 Matsuda, “Ryōtai Shoki no Taiwan”.
39 Hayase, “The Career of Gotō Shinpei”.
40 The concept is taken from Julia Adeney Thomas, Reconfiguring Modernity, p.38.
44 Mochiji Rokusaburō, Taiwan shokuminchi seisaku (Colonial Policy in Taiwan) (Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 1912), p.370
45 Inō, Taiwan Banjin jijō, p.112.
46 The Government-General’s Bureau of Police issued a map in 1912 that indicates clearly the island-wide intensity of anti-Japanese activity among Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples throughout the so-called Aborigine territory, Taiwan sōokufu minseibu banmuohon-sho, ed. Riban gaiyō (Taihoku, December 1912).
50 Barclay, “Cultural Brokerage”.
51 Tavares, “Japanese Colonial State”.
52 Yao, “Governing the Colonised”.
53 Kobayashi, “Inō Kanori”.