Imitation dynamics in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: An exploratory example

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Imitation dynamics in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: An exploratory example

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dc.contributor.author Ruebeck, Christopher S.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-11-30T19:42:57Z
dc.date.available 2010-11-30T19:42:57Z
dc.date.issued 1999
dc.identifier.citation Ruebeck, C. S. 1999. "Imitation dynamics in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: An exploratory example." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 40 (1): 81-104 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10385/762
dc.description.abstract This paper investigates a deterministic evolutionary process governing the adoption of strategies for playing the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Agents playing unsuccessful strategies attempt to imitate the strategies of successful agents. Because agents' strategies are unobservable, they must be inferred from a memory of pairwise play and a knowledge of the strategy space. As a result, winning strategies can be confused with other, inferior strategies, and this imperfect imitation can enhance the growth (or slow the decline) of under-performing strategies. In contrast to results obtained under payoff-monotonic dynamics such as the replicator dynamic or an analysis of Neutrally Stable Strategies, cooperation is eliminated in the long run; agents' inability to observe the strategies of successful players can fundamentally change the evolutionary dynamics. en_US
dc.publisher Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization en_US
dc.subject repeated game en_US
dc.subject replicator dynamic en_US
dc.subject observable strategy en_US
dc.subject limit of means en_US
dc.title Imitation dynamics in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: An exploratory example en_US
dc.type Article en_US

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