On the possibility of conceptually structured experience: Demonstrative concepts and fineness of grain

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On the possibility of conceptually structured experience: Demonstrative concepts and fineness of grain

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dc.contributor.author Shieber, Joseph
dc.date.accessioned 2010-11-16T16:57:14Z
dc.date.available 2012-02-01T08:30:06Z
dc.date.issued 2010-08
dc.identifier.citation Shieber, J. (2010) "On the possibility of conceptually structured experience: Demonstrative concepts and fineness of grain." Inquiry 53 (4): 383-397. en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10385/751
dc.description.abstract In this paper I consider one of the influential challenges to the notion that perceptual experience might be completely conceptually structured, a challenge that rests on the idea that conceptual structure cannot do justice to the fineness of grain of perceptual experience. In so doing, I canvass John McDowell's attempt to meet this challenge by appeal to the notion of demonstrative concepts and review some criticisms recently leveled at McDowell's deployment of demonstrative concepts for this purpose by Sean D. Kelly. Finally, I suggest that, though Kelly's criticisms might challenge McDowell's original presentation of demonstrative concepts, a modified notion of demonstrative concepts is available to the conceptualist that is proof against Kelly's criticisms. en_US
dc.publisher Inquiry en_US
dc.title On the possibility of conceptually structured experience: Demonstrative concepts and fineness of grain en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2010.493371

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